Safety and/or Sovereignty? European Skies After the Icelandic Volcano Crisis by Gruber, Isaac
Chicago Journal of International Law 
Volume 12 Number 1 Article 10 
6-1-2011 
Safety and/or Sovereignty? European Skies After the Icelandic 
Volcano Crisis 
Isaac Gruber 
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil 
Recommended Citation 
Gruber, Isaac (2011) "Safety and/or Sovereignty? European Skies After the Icelandic Volcano Crisis," 
Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 12: No. 1, Article 10. 
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol12/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please 
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu. 
Safety and/or Sovereignty? European Skies After the
Icelandic Volcano Crisis
Isaac Gruber*
Abstract
The 2010 eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafiallajdkull led to an unprecedented
cessation of European air traffic. Since the crisis, European air regulators have aggressively
advocated for accelerated implementation of the second phase of the Single European Sky
reforms, which would effectivey eliminate national borders in air travel by delegating soveregn
air traffic management to mulfilateral entities. However, this Comment aTgues that, contrary to
the oficial version of events, this cure-more centraliZed dedsion-making-contributed to the
crisis's escalation in the first place. A better solution, with greater legitimacy under existing
European Union and United Nations agreements, is to maintain a system of national air
traffic management while empowering private carriers to make cancellation decisions with input
from outside agencies as requested. National sovereignty should be respected in air traffic
regulation not just because of its historic relevance, but because the practical costs of the loss of
soveregnty in air traffic management can be impermissibly high. In shor, there should not be a
tradeoff in European aviation between innovations in safety and maintaining the sovereignty of
individual nations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajokull,' an ice cap volcano on the southern
tip of Iceland, led to an unprecedented shutdown of air traffic in twenty-five
European states, adversely impacting millions of air travel passengers around the
world and leading to billions of dollars in economic losses.2 To European
authorities, the crisis illuminated the chaotic state of European air traffic
regulation, and the necessity of further integration of European air traffic
management under the second Single European Sky (SES-II) package of
reforms to prevent future air traffic crises.' However, this position-tainted
I The volcano's name is pronounced "AYA-feeyapla-yurkul." See Robert Mackey, One Word:
Eyjafallajokull, New York Times (Mar 26, 2010), online at
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/one-word-eyjaffallajokull (visited Apr 11, 2011).
For a recent scientific analysis noting the unusual roots of the volcanic explosion, see Freysteinn
Sigmundsson, et al, Intrusion triggering of the 2010 Ejafallajdkull explosive eruption, 468 Nature 426
(Nov 17, 2010). For a less technical yet similarly interesting report, see British Geological Survey,
Volcanic Eruption in Iceland (Natural Environment Research Council Sept 8, 2010), online at
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/research/highlights/icelandicash.html (visited Apr 11, 2011).
2 See Alberto Alemanno, The European Volcanic Ash Crisis: Between International and European Law,
ASIL Insights (July 13, 2010), online at http://www.asil.org/insights100713.cfm#_ednref5
(visited Apr 11, 2011) (10 million passengers were unable to travel due to over 100,000 cancelled
flights). The global airline industry was said to have lost $200 million per day on air traffic
cancellations, according to the International Air Transport Association, an airline trade
organization. See Graeme Wearden, Ash cloud costing airnes £130m a day, The Guardian (Apr 16,
2010), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/16/iceland-volcano-airline-
industry-iata (visited Apr 11, 2011).
3 Council Regulation 1070/2009 2009 OJ (L 300/34) online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1070:EN:HTML:NOT (visited
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simultaneously by nirvana fallacy and political expediency-lacks even modest
recognition of or care for the concept of national sovereignty, which it sees as a
mere roadblock on the highway to a unified European sky.4 This Comment
argues that not only does national sovereignty provide valuable insights into the
European response to the crisis, but also that it is a vital concept that cannot be
shuffled to the side under the existing international legal framework governing
air travel.
The volcanic eruption produced a massive cloud of ash that entered the jet
stream above Iceland and floated over the UK and continental Europe.' As the
ash cloud hovered over mainland Europe, a disorganized band of airlines,
sovereign air traffic managers, and multilateral authorities competed amongst
themselves to impose their own solution on the skies of Europe, with differing
beliefs about the dangers the ash would pose to jet engines in flight.' Ultimately,
the influence of a single multilateral regulator led sovereigns to apply the
precautionary principle strictly and to overrule the independent judgment of the
airlines, who wished to fly, leading to the cancellation of thousands of flights and
stranding millions of passengers. The regulators, however, eventually
surrendered to political pressure and relaxed the particle density threshold at
which passenger jets could travel and the European skies re-opened.7
In the aftermath of the crisis, calls for a further integrated European
airspace under an accelerated adoption of the second phase of the European
Commission's Single European Sky program grew louder. As may be expected,
the European Commission is strongly in favor of these reforms-even while
national populations are increasingly skeptical of surrendering state sovereignty
to greater European integration.' But before Europe resolves this conflict and
embraces the ultimate vision of SES-II, several questions must be asked. Is such
integration legal under the existing European and international air traffic
management (ATN) framework? Is there a necessary tradeoff between air traffic
Apr 11, 2011) (amending Council Regulations 549/2004, 550/2004, 551/2004 and 552/2004 in
order to improve the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system).
4 European Union Press Release, Single European Sky Second Package (SES IIe)-&A (June 24,
2008), online at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/432&format=HTML&a
ged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (visited Apr 11, 2011) ("The process of integration ...
regardless of national borders, has encountered numerous hurdles. Air traffic control is
mistakenly related to national sovereignty. Obviously this is a complex argument, but instead of
prompting innovative solutions for exercising sovereignty, it has been used to block cross-border
integration.").
5 See Section III.
6 See Section III.C.
7 Id.
8 See generally Janet Laible, Separatism and Soveregnty in the New Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
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safety and sovereignty? What are the costs of increased regulatory centralization,
and can the dueling concepts of sovereignty and safety be reconciled? This
Comment seeks to use the Icelandic volcano crisis as a mechanism to answer
these questions, and to argue modestly for a future ATM framework that
protects the sovereign interests of each individual nation while retaining the
benefits of an integrated system.
Accordingly, the analysis will proceed as follows: Section II explains the
disorganized legal framework out of which the current structure of European
ATM evolved, focusing primarily on the balance of power between the UN's
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the independent
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). Section
III details the volcano crisis itself, with attention paid to the crisis response as it
proceeded under the framework. Section IV considers the events of the crisis in
light of proposals currently being pushed for expedited approval to unify
European airspace under SES-II, the second phase of Eurocontrol's so-called
"Single European Sky" integration, and the legality of such integration under
existing ICAO doctrine. Finally, Section V argues that in the debate over the
Single European Sky, whether or not delegation of sovereignty to multilateral
organizations is ultimately necessary for an air traffic management system that
provides optimum flight safety, the concept of national sovereignty should be
more than a mere footnote.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The broad framework of airspace management, air travel regulation, the
oversight of airports, and the regulation of air carriers have been previously
examined in great detail.? This Comment's focus, therefore, will be on the
9 The web of overlapping supranational, multilateral, bilateral, and sovereign air transportation
regulatory bodies in Europe is extremely complex. For the purposes of this Comment, I will focus
exclusively on air traffic management and the multitude of bureaucracies to which it is assigned.
Other frequently analyzed topics in European aviation law include competition law, open skies
agreements, environmental regulation (including noise regulation), carrier liability, labor relations,
fare regulation, passenger rights, flight security, the intersection of military and civilian aviation,
and carrier regulation (or, in the modern context, deregulation). For a broad contemporary
overview, see generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, European Aviation Law (Kluwer 2004); Jeffrey
Goh, European Air Transport Law and Competition (Wiley 1997) (providing more detail on EU
competition law as applied to the airline context); Martin Bartlik, The Impact of EU Law on the
Regulation of International Air Transportation (Ashgate 2007). For a general introduction to
international aviation law, see Paul B. Larsen, Aviaion Law. Cases, Laws and Related Sources 35-72,
231-66 (Transnational 2006).
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narrower question of the provision of European ATM responsibilities.'o Even
within these narrower parameters, and the short history of European air travel,
there have been numerous iterations of regulation and disparate layers of
bureaucracy, each intended to serve a unique purpose, though with a result of
tremendous overlap and confusion. Yet at its most basic, European ATM has
three layers, working backwards from broad powers to narrow. The first, outer
layer, is the regime provided by the UN's ICAO agency; for the purposes of this
Comment, this most critically concerns the general oversight of airspace through
standard-setting, enforcement of domestic sovereign airspace control, a
meteorological analysis function, and an oft-unused disaster investigation role."
The second, intermediate layer of regulation is that of the EU, including the
European Commission and Eurocontrol, a strictly European agency that
provides a broader array of centralized air travel regulations and actual ATM.12
The third, and innermost layer, is the ATM policies of the individual sovereign
nations themselves, and their interplay with and governance of airports and the
air carriers themselves.
The following sections will examine these layers in precisely that order.
A. Early Multilateral Air Traffic Management' 3
The same expanded scope of international regulatory institutions" that
coincided with the end of World War II drove the political will for regulation of
global air transport. The rise of new, more powerful, civilian jet aircraft traveling
at high altitudes where previously only military aircraft could fly led to a need to
better coordinate the usage of airspace between sovereigns." To that end, the
US invited fifty-four nations from around the globe to Chicago, Illinois, in
November 1944, with the goal of establishing uniform standards for global civil
10 Despite the narrow focus of this Comment on the relationship between the European ATM
framework and the reality of the Icelandic volcano crisis, the relative costs and benefits of
regulatory centralization are widely applicable to other forms of integration in other locales.
II See Section II.A (concerning the role of ICAO).
12 See Section II.B (concerning the role of Eurocontrol).
13 For further reading on ICAO and its relationship to the broader global air regulation framework
as mentioned in note 9, see generally Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (Boom
Eleven International 2008).
14 See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of GlobaliZaion (Oxford 2004). See also John H. Jackson,
William J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, Jr, The Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases,
Materials, and Texts 1, 208 (West 5th ed 1986).
15 See Amir A. Majid, Iegal Status of International Institutions: SITA, INMARASAT and
EUROCONTROL Examined 91-92 (Dartmouth 1996) (exploring Eurocontrol's history and legal
authority).
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aviation." The resulting agreement, known as the Chicago Convention,"
established both a small provisional international organization, and then later
ICAO, which formally came into being in 1947, ten years prior to the Treaty of
Rome."
Most critically, under Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, member states
continue to maintain sovereignty over the airspace above their territory." Under
Article 2, "territory" is defined as the "land areas and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty ... of such State."20 It is noteworthy that the first
major multilateral effort to integrate air transportation began with what is
essentially an affirmation of the Roman maxim ad coelum.2 1 This maxim originates
with the ideas of Gaius, a second century Roman jurist, and affirms the absolute
right of a property owner to both the land and the sky as it rises infinitely above
it.22 W recognition of the maxim as a doctrine under modern law is at best
questionable,23 the maxim is transferable to the ICAO context as affirming
sovereignty as a bedrock principle in the management of airspace. Under this
16 See Milde, ICAO at 14-16 (cited in note 13).
'7 Convention on International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago (1944), Art 1, 61 Stat 1180
("Chicago Convention"), online at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/7300_orig.pdf
(visited Apr 11, 2011).
18 See generally id. Of the three foundational treaties of what is now the EU, the one most relevant
to air traffic management and safety is what is generally known as the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty
aimed to create the European "common market" and increase economic efficiency among its
participating nations through an area of free trade. See Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (Mar 25, 1957), preamble, 298 UN Treaty Ser 11, (entered into force Jan
1, 1958). For a thorough timeline of the integration of Europe since 1944, see John McCormick,
The European Union: Poltics and Polides 395 (Westview 4th ed 2008). Three major unifications that
the EU aspires to under the Single Market is a single currency, a single transportation network
(without the use of passports for internal travel), and entirely free internal trade. For more details,
and an example of how regional integration progresses, see id at 22. The first multilateral air treaty
was the International Commission for Air Navigation ("ICAN'), established in 1919 and entered
into force in 1922, under the auspices of the League of Nations. ICAN, though with different
responsibilities and lacking US membership, ended up being folded into ICAO, and the leader of
ICAN at the time became the first leader of ICAO during its provisional phase. See International
CommissionforAirNaigaion, 1 Intl Org 383, 383-84 (1947).
19 Chicago Convention, Art 1 (cited in note 17).
20 Id, at Art 2.
21 "Whosoever owns the land, owns to the sky and to the bottom of the earth." For this translation
of the Roman maxim, see Richard A. Epstein, Cbertrespass, 70 U Chi L Rev 73, 75 (2003). See also
Lora D. Lashbrook, The 'Ad Coelum" Maxim as Apped to Aviation Law, 21 Notre Dame L R 143
(March 1946) (providing an example of how ad coelum was interpreted at the time of the Chicago
Convention). For another formulation of the Roman maxim, see Brian F. Havel, Beyond Open
Skies: A New Regimefor InternationalAiation 99 n 3 (2009).
22 See Lashbrook, 21 Notre Dame L R at 143 (cited in note 21).
23 See, for example, Hinman v Paific Air Transport, 84 F2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir 1936) (providing an
example of this phenomenon in the modem context).
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analogy, the sovereign nation is the property owner, and only it can legitimately
govern the usage of the skies above its lands. Even after assenting to the
Chicago Convention, every state has to make the autonomous decision as to
"which extent, by whom and when its airspace is used." 24
Despite the passage of time, ICAO still exists to affirm those sovereign
rights under its Chicago Convention responsibilities. 25 In 2005, ICAO member
nations formally amended their agreement to update ICAO's vision and mission
statement. 26 Today, ICAO is organized as a specialized agency of the UN under
the Economic and Social Council.27 ICAO provides for uniform civil aviation
regulation and affirms the sovereignty of each signatory nation's skies.28 ICAO's
regulatory jurisdiction does not include air traffic control management or
integration. Currently, ICAO has been assented to by 190 of the 192 UN
member states.29 Most importantly, for these nations, ICAO establishes
international air measurement standards, international airport codes, and
baseline regulations for air transport.30 Further, in recent years, ICAO has
assumed a role in environmental regulation." While aviation is excluded from
24 Bartlik, The Impact ofEU Law at 3 (cited in note 9) (outlining the "eight freedoms in international
air law," all of which are premised on state sovereignty).
25 For a broad overview of ICAO's modern goals and role in the regulation of international air
space, see ICAO, Strategic Objectives 2005-2010, online at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/strategic_objectives 2005_2010_en.pdf (visited Apr 13, 2011). For
further details on ICAO's current power, see generally Ludwig Weber, International CivilAiation
OrganiZation:An Introduction (Kluwer Law 2007).
26 For details, see Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Aeropoltics 263 (Nova 2009). For a general history of
European aviation since the Chicago Convention, and that of European flag carriers in particular,
see generally Hans-Liudger Dienel and Peter Lyth, eds, Fying the Flag: European Commercial Air
Transport since 1945 (St Martin's 1998). For the statute's 2006 revision, see Convention on
International Civil Aviation (2006), Doc 7300/9 online at
http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/7300cons.pdf (visited Apr 13, 2011).
27 United Nations Charter (1947) Art 7 (1948) (defining the Economic and Social Council, which
allows for subsidiary organs to be created under the UN umbrella; this is the authority under
which ICAO was incorporated), See also Abeyratne, Aeropoiics at 265 (cited in note 26) ("ICAO
is the specialized agency of the United Nations").
28 Chicago Convention, Art I (cited in note 17).
29 ICAO, Member States, online at http://www.icao.int/cgi/statesDB4.pl?en (visited Apr 13, 2011).
For details on the UN's 192 member states, see United Nations, Member States, online at
http://www.un.org/en/members/ (visited Apr 27, 2011).
30 See, for example, Milde, ICAO at 156-64 (cited in note 13) ("When aircraft cross the national
boundaries they must be assured of uniform standards for personnel training and licensing, rules
of the air, units of measurement, certification of airworthiness, aeronautical communications,
characteristics of airports, aircraft operation, and many other aspects.").
31 Id, at 198 ("[E]nvironmental protection is gradually becoming one of the top priorities in the
work program of ICAO.").
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the Kyoto Protocol, recent ICAO responsibilities include the establishment of
commensurate environmental standards for air traffic.32
Notably absent from the Chicago Convention or its subsequent revisions
are any ICAO ATM responsibilities, any role in coordinated safety or navigation,
and any meaningful disaster investigation role (insofar as it is limited and
typically unused).33  However, one of ICAO's more narrowly-tailored
responsibilities, under a meteorological observation and data collection function,
is to lead the development of the Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAAC).3
These centers are data-collection offices, generally housed within sovereign
meteorological offices, which have the specialized task of monitoring volcanic
eruptions and the subsequent ash plumes.3 ' The London branch of the VAAC,
for example, is housed within the offices of the UK's key governmental weather
monitor, the so-called Met Office, but also provides ICAO-mandated services as
an outpost for the monitoring of volcanic ash in the North Atlantic. This sort of
dual role is common to the VAAC infrastructure-there are eight other VAAC
outposts in, among other locations, Tokyo, Montreal (the headquarters of
ICAO), Washington DC (where VAAC is housed in an office of the US
government's meteorological service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA)), and others, all established under ICAO and the UN's
meteorological monitoring mandate.
Despite these seemingly modest Chicago Convention goals, at the time of
its establishment, ICAO in reality saw itself as, perhaps, an all-encompassing
regulator of the skies, under Article 55(a) of its charter.3 ' Article 55(a) allowed
32 See, for example, ICAO, Environment Branch, online at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env2010/index.html (visited Apr 13, 2011) ("In 2004, ICAO
adopted three major environmental goals, to (a) limit or reduce the number of people affected by
significant aircraft noise; (b) limit or reduce the impact of aviation emissions on local air quality;
and (c) limit or reduce the impact of aviation greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate.').
See also ICAO Air Transport Bureau, Environment Branch: Aicraft Engine Emissions, online at
http://www.icao.int/env/aee.htm (visited Apr 27, 2011) ("International aviation emissions are
currently excluded from the [Kyoto Protocol] targets.').
33 Chicago Convention, Art 26 ("[Inn the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State
occurring in the territory of another contracting State.. .procedure... may be recommended by
[ICAO].").
3 Weber, Introduction at 56 (cited in note 25).
35 See International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group Home Page, online at
http://www2.icao.int/en/anb/met-aim/met/iavwopsg/Pages/default.aspx (visited Apr 16, 2011)
36 Id.
37 Repertogy-Guide to the Convention on International Civl Aviation, 2d ed, 1977, ICAO Doc 8900/02,
Article 55. See also Weber, Introdueion at 12 (cited in note 25) (describing the "drafters
[as] ... envisag[ing] ICAO as a global, all-encompassing international intergovernmental agency for
civil aviation.").
/Vol 12 No. 1236
Safety and/or Sovereignty?
for ICAO to set up regional subsidiaries to manage regional air transport
issues. Instead of developing a global infrastructure under this power, however,
various intergovernmental bodies have been established outside of ICAO. Not
strictly a part of ICAO, but also not entirely legally separate, these regional
organizations include the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC),
established in 1954." Regional bodies like the ECAC maintain this intermediate
status with a regional secretariat housed on the premises of a regional office of
ICAO, but at the same, the time costs are borne by the "regional body itself"
and not ICAO. 0 Similar to ICAO, its parent, ECAC, does not provide for any
major operational ATM services. 41
B. Eurocontrol and the Development of a Modern Air Traffic
Management Infrastructure
The UN's establishment of ICAO created a baseline of regulation over
global airspace and established (or, rather, affirmed) the right of a sovereign to
its airspace, yet it did so while imbuing ICAO with few proactive responsibilities.
In contrast, European nations have carved out many more substantive,
operational powers for regional regulation of their own airspace. This is best
viewed as a manifestation of a sort of federalism, in which, at a global level,
airspace is regulated only in very specific situations with broad, clearly delineated
rules and standards. 42 However, at the continental or regional level, more
ongoing regulatory power is delegated to multilateral bodies.
Because of the number of small countries within a relatively small air mass
(twenty-seven countries divided among a continent roughly the size of the US
Midwest) and the fact that most of them are major air traffic destinations,
Europe's skies are some of the most crowded in the world, and they face
tremendous long-term capacity challenges. 43 Flights traveling between nations or
over Europe need to switch repeatedly between small countries' air traffic
38 Id (discussing the intermediate status of EACA and similar regional bodies).
39 See Betsy Gidwitz, The Polics ofInternationalAir Transport 89 (Lexington 1980).
40 See Weber, Introduction at 120 (cited in note 25).
41 European Civil Aviation Conference Home Page, The European CivlAviation Conference, online at
https://www.ecac-ceac.org//about-ecac/historyofecac/theecac (visited Apr 27, 2011).
42 For another usage of federalism in an interpretation of modern Europe, see generally Michael
Burgess, Federalism and European Union: The Buiking ofEurope, 1950-2000 (Routledge 2000).
43 The number of flights in Europe is expected to double by 2030, with passengers embarking on
longer distance trips with greater frequency. See generally Eurocontrol, Long-Term Forecast: IFR
Fkght Movements 2010-2030, online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/statfor/gallery/content/public/forecasts/Doc4l5-LTF10-Report-
Voll.pdf. (visited June 20, 2011).
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controllers, creating additional transition points between controllers and thus, at
least the possibility of more room for error.'
Europe's regional regulation of transportation and air transport stretches
back to the beginning of European regulation itself. The Treaty of Rome
established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 as part of the
Common Transport Policy.45 Later, the EEC established Trans-European
Networks (as a part of the Single Market policy of the late 1980s) and further
consolidated its regulatory approach to uniform transportation throughout
Europe.46 The multilateral air traffic services coordinator, which executes much
of the European Commission's policy, is Eurocontrol-formally known as the
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation. Eurocontrol is an
international organization, and began from the same theoretical roots as much
of Europe's multilateral air regulation: as Eurocontrol has stated, with numerous
nations "between which there are substantial differences in terms of equipment,
capabilities, funding etc," 47 a powerful regulator is required to harmonize
standards and provide unified ATM services and communication.
Six original nations (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, with the UK and Ireland soon to follow)
established Eurocontrol as a separate international organization, independent of
the formal Treaty of Rome structure. The agreement codifying its founding,
the 1960 Eurocontrol International Convention relating to Cooperation for the
44 An appropriate analogy would be to the twenty-one route centers throughout the US, all
coordinated by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As a plane flies from one to
another, it switches radio contact to a new tower. Europe, however, has seventy-five route
centers, with an average of three per sovereign. Overall, only one European route center is
actually managed by Eurocontrol (the UAC center, which manages the airspace of Belgium,
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and parts of Germany) while an additional Eurocontrol center is being
constructed in Vienna for ATM in Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Italy, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
45 The second so-called "Treaty of Rome" provided for the establishment of an integrated
European atomic regulatory body. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community Art 3(e), 298 UN Treaty Ser 11.
46 See Trans-European Networks Home Page, online at http://ec.europa.eu/ten/indexen.html
(visited Apr 13 , 2011).
47 John Balfour, European Communiy Air Law 135 (Butterworths 1995).
48 Majid, Legal Status at 91-95 (cited in note 15).
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Safety of Air Navigation (1960 Agreement),49 was to last for an initial term of
50twenty years.
During its early years under the 1960 Agreement, Eurocontrol was charged
with two responsibilities: to provide upper air traffic management services for its
member nations" and to collect route charges from airlines, which were then
remitted back to its member nations. It was thought that because nations like
Belgium or Luxembourg are so small, establishing separate air traffic centers
within their borders would be inefficient. In advance of the first goal,
Eurocontrol established the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (UAC) in
1972 as the first air traffic control center to manage the air traffic of more than
one state-it covered Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and northern
Germany. However, early on, it was Eurocontrol's route charge collection role
that attracted the most criticism, and failed legal challenge, from private
airlines.52
Eurocontrol's role continued to evolve in parallel with the development of
technology enabling the current globalized air traffic environment." By January
1986, when a new Eurocontrol agreement came into force to replace the original
1960 Agreement, the focus of its regulation was no longer simply upper-air
coordination, but also to serve as a mechanism to further European integration
and a single system for European air traffic control.5 4  But by the 1990s, the
airspace was as crowded and disorganized as ever." The brutal reality, according
to Eurocontrol, was that "[o]ne-third of all flights experienced delays, with an
average delay of 20 minutes and delays of several hours being not uncommon
during peak traffic periods." 6 Thus, in 1997, another revised Eurocontrol
agreement came into force, this time expanding Eurocontrol management over
further aspects of European flight, including takeoffs and landings, formal
rulemaking regulatory power in the EC, and, most critically for its legality,
49 Eurocontrol International Convention relating to Cooperation for the Safety of Air Navigation
(1960), 523 UN Treaty Ser 117.
50 Eurocontrol's history and legal authority was explored in Majid, Legal Status at 91 (cited in note
15). See also Eurocontrol Home Page, Eumcontrol Offcial History (Aug 27, 2004), online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/dossiers/50-years-achievements (visited Apr 13, 2011).
51 With the rise of jet-powered civilian aircraft, Eurocontrol's earliest responsibility included
coordinating airplanes flying in the zone above twenty thousand feet altitude, an airspace at
which, prior to this time, only military planes would travel. See Majid, Legal Status at 91 (cited in
note 15).
52 Id at 93.
53 Id at 91-95.
54 Id at 94.
ss Dempsey, Eumpean Amation Law at 138 (cited in note 9).
s6 Id.
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setting forth the formal accession of the European Community (now the
European Union (EU), under the Treaty of Lisbon) to Eurocontrol."
Accordingly, Eurocontrol has grown from a small agency handling air traffic
control at a specified altitude (and to sovereigns who specifically request
Eurocontrol ATM services) to an agency to which some countries delegate not
only route management but also ATM."
Eurocontrol exercises this power through its Central Flow Management
Unit (CFMU), which, while not serving a practical European air traffic control
role, plays a broader coordinating role in assisting air traffic managers in route
guidance, crisis management, utilization of capacity, and congestion problem
solving." The major operational role of Eurocontrol is vested in CFMU, given
its larger traffic coordination role. During the Icelandic crisis, the CFMU
became the central problem solver in assisting sovereign air traffic managers
making cancellation decisions, and became a hub for all European multilateral
crisis management while the ash cloud was in the air.60
C. Single Sky Reforms and the Role of Nations in the
European Vision
Under the above framework, Europe (and the world) has gone through
tremendous change in terms of how airlines are governed and regulated.6 The
twenty-first century has brought a new world of air transport, and the European
community has developed a series of regulations intended to bring European air
travel regulation to a new level of integration.
Eurocontrol is unique as compared with most other air regulatory agencies
around the world by serving a limited ATM services role, yet at the same time
57 See Eurocontrol Home Page, 1990-2000: Towards seamless European Airpace, online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/1990-2000-towards-seamless-european-airspace (visited Apr
13, 2011) (noting the 1997 revised Convention).
58 See Eurocontrol Home Page, 2010 and Beyond, online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/2010-and-beyond (visited Apr 13, 2011) (detailing the future
vision for Eurocontrol's role in air traffic management).
s9 Eurocontrol Home Page, Mission Statement, online at
http://www.cfmu.eurocontrol.int/cfmu/public/standard-page/about-missionstatement.html
(visited Apr 13, 2011).
6o See Section III.C.
61 In the context of European deregulation, airlines mirroring Southwest in the US have risen, the
most notable of which is Ryanair. For a popular account of their rise under the modernization of
European air regulation, see generally Siobhin Creaton, Ryanair How a Small Irisb Airne Conquered
Europe (Aurum 2004). For an academic consideration of the modem European air transport
business, see generally Kenneth Button, Wings Across Europe: Towards an Efficient European Air
Transport System (Ashgate 2004).
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also playing a broader regulatory role. 62 The Single European Sky (SES-I) reform
packages of the last decade are the clearest evidence of the effect of the most
recent technological advances in aviation on the evolution of European air
traffic management and Eurocontrol's dual role. In November, 2000,
recognizing the need for a more advanced pan-European ATM system, a high-
level group of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy and
Transport delivered a report on the future of integrated ATM in the EU, setting
out a variety of goals for the future and a twenty-year timeframe for their
* 63implementation.
After Eurocontrol presented, and the parties negotiated and approved the
SES-1 package of reforms, it officially came into being in 2004. The SES-I
declaration of policy evokes the broad governance of ICAO, as it was said to
have been developed "in line with the principles laid down by the 1944 Chicago
Convention."' However, the changes implemented by Eurocontrol under the
actual plan seem inconsistent with what the Chicago Convention actually meant
(namely, a member state's full retention of its sovereignty). As Eurocontrol itself
says, "Europe eliminated frontiers on the ground with the 1985 single European
market. It dismantled economic frontiers with the 1990 economic and monetary
union. It is a view widely held that borders in the sky should not exist."6 This is
obviously a reflection of the European Commission's efforts, at the time, to
integrate Eurocontrol, then a separate multilateral organization, into the
European Commission and to take control over all air traffic management in
Europe-beyond high altitude coordination and into day-to-day civil aviation
management.
Given the proposal's breadth, Eurocontrol designed the original SES-I
regulation for implementation in phases.6 ' The short term goals were to establish
a definition of the actions to be taken and their scope, the accession of the
62 Though obviously serving only one nation, the FAA is structured in a similar way, imbued with
both ATM and regulatory responsibilities.
63 European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Single European Sky: Report
ofthe bigb-levelgroup (European Communities 2001).
6 Commission Regulation 549/2004, Art 1, 2004 OJ (L 96), online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004RO549:EN:NOT (visited Apr 13,
2010).
65 Horst Hering, Air Traffic Freeway System for Europe, EEC-INO and Eurocontrol Experimental
Centre, ECC Note No 20/05, 2.1 (Nov 2005), online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/eec/gallery/content/public/document/eec/report/2005/0 3 1_Air_
TrafficFreewaySystem forEurope.pdf (visited Apr 13, 2011).
6 See Pablo Mendes de Leon, The Relationsbi Between Eurocontrol and the EC: Liing Apart Together, 4
Intl Orgs L Rev 305, 313 (2008) (detailing the relationship between the EC and Eurocontrol in
light of the Single Sky reforms).
67 European Commission, Single European Sky at 2.3 141 (cited in note 63).
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European Commission to Eurocontrol (which was, at that time, still an
independent entity), improved civil/military cooperation, and support to
national safety authorities for implementation of interim safety regulations.
During the so-called medium term of implementation, goals included
establishment of system optimization, organization to monitor system capacity,
implementation of single European airspace, and proposals for enlargement of
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) (the European air safety
regulator, with an exclusive safety focus, as opposed to Eurocontrol's divided
mandate) to cover future ATM safety. Finally, the long-term goal of the project
was to set out EASA responsibility for safety regulation of ATM, relocate
military operations (to alternate altitudes) through "suitable incentives," and to
introduce "new operational concepts for integrated management of airspace.""
Ultimately, this timeline of reforms faced persistent delays and
implementation only began in 2004, with the same consistent goals-key among
them being the establishment of a strong EU-wide regulator, "increasing
synergy" between the EU's regulators and Eurocontrol, and the development of
new technologies.6 ' This technological project, the Single European Sky ATM
Research (SESAR), is intended to serve as the practical method by which
European skies are integrated under a unified ATM technology." SESAR
involves transitioning from using ground and radio communications in air traffic
control to satellite and global positioning system technology. SESAR is the
68 Id at 38.
69 Eurocontrol, SES-I Home Page, online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/ses/public/standard-page/ses_1.html (visited Apr 13, 2011).
70 SESAR Joint Undertaking Home Page, online at http://www.sesarju.eu/about (visited Apr 13,
2011).
7' The satellite system in Europe is known as GALLILEO. See European Union, Single Sky .Q'A
Press Release, online at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/432&format=HTMLf&a
ged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (visited Apr 13, 2011):
The GALILEO satellite radio navigation system, launched by the [EU] and the
European Space Agency, is the first worldwide satellite positioning and
navigation system specifically designed for civil purposes. It will not only
complement the current (US military) GPS system, but also offer state-of-the-
art services with increased performance in terms of accuracy, continuity and
availability in comparison to today's satellite navigation systems. The
development and deployment of the GALILEO programme is fully financed
by the European Commission (C3.2 billion) (including the construction and
launch of thirty satellites and the setting up of the ground-based components)
and is scheduled to start operating from 2013 onwards. Each aircraft in the
Single European Sky will have to be equipped with new positioning
capabilities: more precise and available everywhere even when there is no
ground support (international water). In this sense, Galileo is the perfect
candidate. The European Aviation System is moving towards a better
performing environment and SESAR will play a key role in achieving the
Single European Sky. For its part, GALILEO will provide an improved and
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European version of NextGen, which is the US version of the same ATM radio-
to-satellite policy. In 2010, Eurocontrol (under the mandate of the SES-I
package) and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agreed to jointly
pursue the SESAR/NextGen technology update.72
The broad scope of the technological mandates of the SES-I reforms
would give rise to the suspicion that it would some day supplant the current
system of sovereign ATM. However, regulation at the national level allows
sovereign governments to retain the ability to establish their own independent
safety and airline regulatory bodies. Ultimately, sovereigns have established their
own crisis management, safety, and meteorological offices, and their own
domestic flight safety agencies that provide the final say on whether to cancel
flights during a given crisis.
Despite this retention of decision-making power, all sovereigns tend to
follow in lockstep behind the guidance of Eurocontrol-particularly as it applied
to the Icelandic crisis. Another major impediment to the retention of sovereignty
under the Single Sky policy is that by delegating the synchronization of civil and
military aircraft to Eurocontrol, sovereign European nations will essentially get
out of the airspace management business, and, at least in the short run, will lose
the ability to manage their own skies. This has caused some consternation
among sovereigns, and has ultimately led to the delay of implementation of
functional airspace blocks and the majority of post-Icelandic crisis reforms
under SES-II.
This European ATM framework-from the broad regulations of ICAO,
Eurocontrol and broad flow management role, EASA and its safety oversight, all
the way down to the individual decision-making power and the ATM role of
sovereigns-was exactly the framework in place during the Icelandic volcano
crisis of 2010.
III. THE FRAMEWORK IN MOTION: THE ICELANDIC VOLCANO
The 2010 Icelandic volcano crisis provides an excellent lens through which
to view how each sovereign and multilateral air traffic regulator set forth in
Section II responded in a crisis setting. Section III.A provides background on
the volcano and exactly how its eruption had the potential to disrupt air traffic
over Iceland, Europe, and the rest of the world. Section III.B describes the
refined satellite navigation system, as a valuable technical tool for civil aviation.
(emphasis removed).
72 John McHale, Europe and US agree to cooperate on SESAR and NextGen (Avionics Intelligence June
29, 2010), online at http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/avi-article-
display/6796396722/articles/avionics-intelligence/news/2010/6/europe-anusagree.htnm
(visited Apr 13, 2011).
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height of the crisis: the April 14th ascent of an ash cloud, which ended up
resulting in the cancellation of European flights flown under instrument flight
rules. Section III.B will also review the response by both multilateral and
sovereign bodies at this point in the crisis. Section III.C reviews the ash cloud's
appearance, and the middle period of the crisis. Section III.D analyzes the crisis
in light of the legal framework set out in Section III, and the response of other
sovereign and multilateral ATM entities. As some observers have said, the
volcano crisis undermined the idea of Eurocontrol's powers by making it clear
that it played no more than an advisory role in the airspace closures of April and
May 2010." Yet whether this is true or not requires a more thorough analysis of
the source of decision-making and its rationale for doing so during the height of
the crisis.
A. The Beginnings of a Crisis
Given the profundity of its recent impact on European fliers, it may be
surprising to learn that Eyjafjallajokull is one of the smaller ice cap volcanoes in
Iceland's southern region. Throughout history, it has been overshadowed by
other nearby volcanoes, 7 4 and prior to 2010, Eyjafjallaj6kull's last eruption took
place between 1821 and 1823, causing relatively minor damage.7 ' Despite this
seemingly minimal past activity, the volcano is continuously monitored through
evaluations of seismic activity and visual inspection by the Icelandic
Meteorological Office (IMO)." The IMO is responsible for "monitoring natural
73 Kenneth P. Quinn, Editor's Column, 23 Air & Space Law 3 (2010) ("[I]n mid-April [2010], for
almost a week, national civil aviation authorities closed huge swaths of European airspace based
on incomplete knowledge of the effects of Icelandic volcanic ash-belying the notion that
EUROCONTROL actually controls European airspace.").
74 The volcano immediately to Eyjafjallajbkull's east, Katla, is substantially larger and has
experienced more frequent eruptions: its last eruption took place in 1918. It is widely thought that
eruptions of Eyjafjallajokull are a harbinger of a Katla eruption. As of this writing, scientists are
actively monitoring Katla for seismic activity that could be evidence of a future eruption even
more dangerous than Eyjafjallajokull's. However, it is Laki, another Icelandic volcano, that has
caused the most damage in Icelandic history: when it erupted in 1783, a resulting famine killed a
quarter of Iceland's population and its atmospheric effects through the release of sulphurous
gases were thought to have devastating consequences on livestock and crops as far as mainland
Europe and atmospheric effects in the nascent United States. See Gunnar Karlsson, The History of
Iceland 177-78 (2000). See also Roger Boyes, Icelandprepares for second, more devastating volcanic eruption,
(The Times Mar 21, 2010), online at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7070239.ece (visited Apr 13,
2011). For a scientific perspective, see Ricardo M. Trigo, M.M. Vaquero, and R.B. Stothers,
Witnessing the impact of the 1783-84 Laki eruption in the Southern Hemisphere, 99 Climactic Change 535,
538-39 (2010).
75 See Boyes, Icelandprepares (The Times, Mar 21, 2010) (cited in note 74).
76 Icelandic Met Office Home Page, online at http://en.vedur.is/ (visited Apr 13, 2011).
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hazards in Iceland and conducting research in related fields, as well as
participating in international monitoring and research."77 In December 2009, the
IMO published a notice of increase in seismic activity during the years 2006-
2009.78 Typically, increases in seismic activity on a volcano serve as a warning
sign for volcanic eruption. Even so, the bulk of the threat posed by
Eyjafjallajokull would typically only affect the local area around the volcano.
Because the volcano is actually under a glacier, any lava that flows from the
volcano will melt ice in the surrounding area, giving it the potential to cause
tremendous flooding in the region."
Nevertheless, the IMO participates in international monitoring, by
delivering data regarding all volcanic activity-regardless of the volcano's
historical legacy-to the London VAAC.' As discussed in Section I above, the
VAAC exists as the primary agency under the ICAO framework for worldwide
volcano monitoring.82 The London VAAC also developed and manages the key
formula, the Numerical Atmospheric-Dispersion Modeling Environment
(NAME), which it uses to evaluate the extent of the potential harm to aircraft by
monitoring the particle density in the air during a crisis, and stipulating limits for
safe air travel.83 At the time of the crisis the London branch of the VAAC was
responsible for monitoring all northeast Atlantic volcanic activity.
The so-called "effusive" phase of the Eyjafjallajokull eruption began on
March 20, and lasted until April 12. During this time, the consequences of the
77 Icelandic Met Office Home Page, Mission Statement, online at http://en.vedur.is/about-
imo/mission/ (visited Apr 13, 2011).
78 See generally Sigurlaug Hjaltad6ttir, Kristin S. Vogfo6, and Ragnar Slunga, Seismic Signs ofMagma
Pathways through the Crust in the Ejafallajokull volcano, South Iceland (Icelandic Met Office Dec 2009),
online at http://www.vedur.is/media/vedurstofan/utgafa/skyrslur/2009/VI_2009_013.pdf
(visited Apr 27, 2011).
79 See, for example, Oddur Sigurosson, et al, Flood warning system and jokulblaups (Icelandic Met
Office), online at http://en.vedur.is/hydrology/articles/nr/2097 (visited Apr 13, 2011).
80 See, for example, Icelandic Met Office, Increased glacial melt due to volcanic ash, online at
http://en.vedur.is/hydrology/articles/nr/2110 (visited Apr 13, 2011).
81 See VAAC Home Page, online at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/aviation/vaac/ (visited Apr 13,
2011).
82 See Section II.A; notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
83 The UK's Met Office originally developed the NAME model to track the movement of radiation
in the wake of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and even today is not limited to volcanic ash or
nuclear fallout, but rather any particulate-form threat to air travel. See VAAC, Volcanic ash
forecasting: How we work (UK Met Office), online at
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/aviation/vaac/forecasting.html (visited Apr 13, 2011).
84 See Section III.B.
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volcano were felt primarily locally in Iceland." On March 22, glacial flooding
began in the areas immediately around the volcano, requiring evacuations of
villages in the vicinity of the volcano." Both Icelandic and European authorities
monitored the effusive phase of the volcano. There is no evidence that at this
point in the eruption either Eurocontrol or other sovereign air traffic
organizations were aware of the impending risk to aircraft."
B. The Ash Cloud's Ascent
The volcanic ash cloud that rose into the sky on April 13 as a result of the
eruptive phase of the volcano, though taking many by surprise, was not a rarity
in history. Volcanic ash clouds, as may be expected, accompany any volcanic
eruption." As happened during this crisis, a volcanic ash cloud is not always
visible to the naked eye, and comprises so-called "abrasive particles," including
glass, sand, and other volcanic debris.
With the ICAO-empowered London VAAC monitoring, Eyjafjallaj6kull's
ash cloud rose as high as thirty thousand feet into the sky-a critical height at
which modern jet aircraft travel-and entered directly into an unexpectedly
85 Contrary to the standard popular image of a volcano exploding magma into the sky, an effusive
eruption results primarily in the flow of lava outside of fissures in the sides of the volcano-in the
case of a glacial volcano, this can have the result of mass flooding. For more details, see US
Geological Survey, Effusive Eruption, online at
http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/images/pglossary/effusive.php (visited Apr 27, 2011). In fact,
flooding was the gravest official concern during the early effusive phase of the Eyjafjallaj6kull
eruption. See Caistor children flee as Iceland volcano erupts (Grimsby Telegraph Mar 22, 2010), online at
http://www.thisisgrimsby.co.uk/news/Children-flee-lives-volcano-erupts/article-1 931098-
detail/article.html (visited Apr 13, 2011) (highlighting the evacuation of 500 people in the area
around the volcano).
86 Ker Than, Iceland Volcano Erupts Under Glacier, Trggers Floods (Natl Geographic Apr 14, 2010),
online at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/04/100414-iceland-volcano-erupts-
evacuate-flooding/ (visited Apr 14, 2011) (describing the local sequence of events: "[aifter an
initial evacuation of nearby villages in March, flooding fears subsided and the Iceland volcano
quickly became a popular tourist attraction").
87 Eurocontrol, European ATM network operations mobised 13 the volcanic ash aids, 3 (May 15, 2010),
online at
http://www.cfmu.eurocontrol.int/cfmu/gallery/content/public/news 2010/volcanic-ash/baa/v
olcanicbasispdf low/o20.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2011) (stating that on the day the explosive
eruption began, a Eurocontrol tactical flow management officer was "called by the current
supervisor on duty to say: 'we have something for you; there is a volcanic eruption in Iceland'. 'I
thought they were joking").
88 In fact, the Icelandic ash cloud was not even the only one of 2010. In November, the eruption of
an Indonesian volcano, Mount Merapi, created an ash cloud that forced President Obama to
modify his travel plans on Air Force One. See Anggoro Rullyano, Flights to resume to Indonesia after
volcanic ash cloud (Timesofmalta.com Nov 9, 2010) online at
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2010110 9 /business/flights-resume-to-indonesia-
after-volcanic-ash-cloud (visited Apr 14, 2010).
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stable jet stream. While in the sky, an ash cloud causes a "sandblasting" effect
due to the composition of the cloud, resulting in irreparable harm to jet
engines." In 1982, a British Airways 747 traveling over Indonesia lost power in
all four of its engines simultaneously while traveling directly through an ash
cloud. Fortunately, it was able to make an emergency landing and tragedy was
averted. Just months later, a second flight lost two of its engines in a similar
cloud. After that point, airline regulators began to look into volcanic ash as a
legitimate threat to air travel, and in line with its safety and standard-setting
responsibilities, ICAO developed a series of guidelines for dealing with volcanic
ash in flight. ICAO has remained in this role consistently since then and in 2007
published its most recent volcanic ash advisory memo."
C. The Crisis In Earnest
The crisis itself can be divided into two halves, fairly neatly arranged by
month: first the initial April ash cloud, and then its May resurgence. Setting off
the initial phase, the London VAAC's reported to Eurocontrol early on April 14
that the volcano had transitioned from effusive to explosive," and the ash cloud
began to rise into the air.92 This was the moment the volcano began to impact
non-Icelandic European travelers and airlines, and this was when the decision
was first made to restrict airspace." The explosive phase had begun, and less
than twenty-four hours later, the ash cloud traveled the 900 miles toward
Northern Europe. Once Eurocontrol received the information from London, it
moved to communicate with the sovereign air traffic controllers and closed the
airspace in Scotland, northern England, and over parts of Norway. While
Eurocontrol conveyed this information, it was actually the Norwegian national
ATM leadership that made the first decision to close its airspace. 94
While, overall, the number of European flights was only slightly down
from the previous week's traffic, Eurocontrol began to set in motion its more
89 Contrary to many laypeople who thought that visibility issues led to flight cancellations, the safety
concern was actually about engine operability issues.
9 The Icelandic ash cloud should also be distinguished from a volcano's main eruption plume,
flying directly through which can be tremendously hazardous to aircraft, particularly in
comparison with most ash clouds.
91 For details on the difference between effusive and explosive eruptions, see note 85.
92 See Eurocontrol Home Page, Volcano Asb Cloud Timelne-April, online at
https://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/volcanic-ash-cloud-timeline-2010-events (visited Apr 27,
2011).
93 Id.
94 Id.
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expanded crisis management response." By the end of the day on April 14,
Eurocontrol implemented its first crisis regulations, mostly a simple transmission
of guidance from the London VAAC, which quickly took the lead in the crisis.96
As it became clear that the ash cloud would not be moving quickly over Europe,
Eurocontrol began a policy of communicating with the numerous sovereign
ATM officials every few hours. These regulators were then empowered to make
cancellation decisions on their own based on Eurocontrol guidance.
The following day set off a week of substantial cancellations. On April 15,
the total number of flights through European airspace was at 20,842, down from
28,578 the week before.9 7 London's Heathrow Airport and all of UK airspace
was closed based on decisions made by the UK's Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA), with only very minor exceptions." Additionally, exacerbating panic
concerning the crisis, a Finnish military test flight showed some evidence of
engine damage from volcanic ash, leading to more widespread cancellations in
the Scandinavian countries, in particular." For six consecutive days, the UK
airspace, with some slight exceptions in southern England, was closed.
Cancellations stretched beyond the UK, east to Germany and south as far as
Italy. 00 By April 18, flights in the UK continued to be canceled, and in light of
major dislocations and uproar, the UK government held a major press
conference, stating that the skies would only be opened when the conditions
were again deemed to be safe.' 0'
Given this delay and the worldwide headlines betraying a lack of
coordination between multilateral regulators, sovereigns, and airlines, the
European Commission and its Spanish president took its own step to work
9s For a helpful timeline, see Eurocontrol Home Page, Volcanic Ash Cloud Chronology (May 2010),
online at https://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/volcanic-ash-cloud-timeline-2010-events (visited
Nov 28, 2010).
96 See Volcanic ash: timekne of the ]Aght disruption (The Telegraph May 16, 2010), online at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travenews/7730428/Volcanic-ash-timeline-of-the-flight-
disruption.html (visited Apr 14, 2011) (highlighting the frustrations of an airline executive in the
late May timeframe).
9 See Eurocontrol Home Page, Volcano Ash Cloud Timekne-April (cited in note 92).
98 See Robert Booth, et al, Volcanic ash keeps flights across Europe grounded (The Guardian Apr 17, 2010),
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/16/volcanic-ash-air-travel-europe (visited
Apr 14, 2011) (detailing the cancellations and a brief 30-minute window in which the Manchester
airport was open).
99 See Craig Hoyle, Pictures: Finnish F-18 engine check reveals effects of volcanic dust (Flightglobal.com Apr
16, 2010), online at http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/04/16/340727/pictures-finnish-
f-1 8-engine-check-reveals-effects-of-volcanic.htm (visited Apr 14, 2011).
100 Eurocontrol Home Page, VokanicAsh Cloud Chronology (cited in note 95).
101 David Brown and David Byers, UK 'no-fl one' to last at least another day (The Times Apr 18, 2010),
online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article7lOl380.ece (visited Apr 14, 2011).
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directly with the VAAC and Eurocontrol's operational unit.10 2 These
stakeholders agreed on a more individualized nation-by-nation assessment of the
risk under the NAME model, which "allowed for a more differentiated
assessment of risk from the ash cloud, while still respecting safety concerns."10 3
However, the airlines were still restless and upset with the strict governmental
"precautionary principle," and did not agree with more conservative
governmental particle density requirements. In fact, on the day of the European
Commission meeting, April 19, both British Airways and the Dutch airliner
KLM flew test flights through the ash cloud in the hopes of convincing the UK
government to relax the particle density threshold to be able to get commercial
flights back into the air.'" Finally, on April 20, the UK let planes fly through ash
for the first time. Later, on April 21, UK airspace re-opened as the ash cloud
began to move away, east and south, towards continental Europe. On this same
date, Iceland's southern skies were clear for the first time since the crisis began.
Despite the UK's brief respite from closures, Europe's skies remained highly
vulnerable to the ash cloud's movements. On April 23, the most cancellations
occurred as the ash cloud continued to move south through Europe.o's Yet by
late April, traffic was beginning to seem like it would return to normal-in fact,
many media outlets began "wrapping up" their coverage of the crisis at this time
and the first phase of the crisis concluded.'06
However, the media's optimism was short-lived. The UK's permission to
allow flying for the end of April was cut short on May 3 when the ash cloud
returned yet again and a second wave of cancellations began as the CAA
temporarily closed the airspace again over much of the UK. The ash cloud
shifted again in early May to cover southern Europe and, on May 9, select
102 The operational entity within Eurocontrol is the CFMU. See Section II.B.
103 European Union Press Release, Volcanic Ash Crisis: Frequent# Asked Questions, (Apr 20, 2010),
online at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/143 (visited
Apr 14, 2011).
104 See Andrew Hough, et al, Volcanic ash cloud restrictions 'embamrassing, say airnes (The Telegraph Apr
19, 2010), online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7605794/Volcanic-ash-cloud-
restrictions-embarrassing-say-airlines.html (visited Apr 14, 2011). In response, after the daily
Eurocontrol press conference, a release was sent out, saying that "in time, it should be possible to
move towards an approach in which full discretion is given to Aircraft Operators." See
Eurocontrol, Reised approach to air traffic affected by the vokanic ash cloud (Apr 19, 2010), online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/press-releases/revised-approach-air-traffic-affected-volcanic-ash-
cloud (visited Apr 14, 2011).
105 Interestingly, for the first time during the crisis, Iceland was forced to close its own airports. See
Volcanic ash cloud: Iceland closes airports for the first time (The Telegraph Apr 23, 2010), online at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7622585/Volcanic-ash-cloud-Iceland-closes-
airports-for-first-time.html (visited Apr 14, 2011).
106 See, for example, Ash figghts ban: UK airports permitted to reopen (BBC Apr 21, 2010), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/8633597.stm (visited Apr 14, 2011).
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airports in Portugal, Spain, and France closed entirely, and sporadic cancellations
continued until May 12 throughout the Iberian Peninsula. By late May, the
situation continued with fewer cancellations than during the mid-April phase,
but with sporadic cancellations, which generally saw the ash cloud morph from a
dreaded crisis to more of a source of bureaucratic frustration, in particular, by
airlines.' 7 Eventually, however, the UK sovereign air regulator enabled the
reopening of the skies with a doubling of the acceptable particle limit-
something that could have substantially lowered the number of daily
cancellations earlier in the crisis. os
By the end of May, the last of the European countries fully re-opened their
skies. In total, the result of the critical eight-day cancellation in April and the
mid-May dislocations included over 100 thousand flights disrupted, 10 million
passenger journeys affected, significant financial losses for airlines, and
incalculable levels of global commerce interrupted.109 For every flight
cancellation in one country, there was a boomerang effect whereby displaced
passengers around the world required accommodations." 0
Though the immediate ash cloud crisis had long been over, Icelandic
scientific officials officially declared the end of the volcanic eruption in October
2010."' The volcano remains active, however, and the cooling-off period will
take months; until that point, the volcano cannot be considered dormant.112 As
the volcano itself fades from the headlines, the debate over the European air
traffic response to this crisis has been pushed to the front page.
107 See, for example, Volcanic ash (cited in note 96).
10 Dan Milmo, Aiports reopen after another day of fmstration as watchdog relaxes volcanic ash cloud safety
threshold (The Guardian May 18, 2010), online at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/18/volcanic-ash-uk-flight-disruption (visited Apr
14, 2011).
109 For a general discussion of the immediate implications of the crisis, see Alemanno, The Eumpean
Volcanic Ash Crisis at 1 (cited in note 2).
110 At one point, after the six-day UK shutdown, cruise ships were sent to Spain to bring back
stranded passengers. Volcanic ash cloud cruise ship diverts to pick up Brits (The Telegraph Apr 20,
2010), online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7608886/Volcanic-ash-cloud-
cruise-ship-diverts-to-pick-up-Brits.html (visited Apr 27, 2011).
111 See Eruption in Iceland's Ejafallajdkull Over (Iceland Review Online Oct 27, 2010), online at
http://icelandreview.com/icelandreview/dailynews/?catid=16539&ew_0_a_id=369471
(visited Apr 14, 2011).
112 BBC, Volcanic ash cloud on 'ause' (BBC News May 19, 2010), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/weather/hi/news/newsid 8691000/8691795.stm (visited Feb 24, 2011)
("Only when the volcano has been 'paused' for three months will it then be regarded as being
dormant.").
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IV. EUROPE'S FUTURE UNDER A SINGLE SKY
During the crisis and in its immediate aftermath, calls were made for a
solution-any solution-to allow for increased coordination, more effective
evaluation of flight safety risks, and a broader, more efficient crisis management
mechanism; all in the hope that fewer flights could be cancelled and fewer
passengers would be left stranded across Europe in a future air travel crisis."' As
discussed above, at the time of the volcano crisis, SES-I had been implemented,
but the second phase had only just passed and was still in the early stages of
implementation.1 14 Therefore, public endorsement of the provisions of SES-II
became the default crutch for European leaders looking for a ready-made
solution to present to millions of enraged passengers."
Section IV.A examines the reaction to the crisis from different quarters.
Section IV.B looks at the provisions of SES-II, with a current implementation
target of 2012. Finally, Section TV.C analyzes the legality of SES-II under the
framework set out in Section II.
A. The Blame Game
Virtually no entity associated with air travel during the crisis was immune
from media or popular criticism. To some outsiders, the key problem of the
crisis was the inability to centrally mandate an airspace closure. Consequently,
calls were widespread for further and quicker integration of European airspace
into a "single sky" for the purposes of air traffic control and risk management.116
The European Commissioner responsible for air traffic management said, for
example, that it was necessary to 'fast track the Single Skies package"'" which
113 See Hough, et al, Volcanic ash cloud (cited in note 104).
114 See Section II.
115 See European Commission Home Page, Transport Ministers Meet to Agree Response to Cisis (May 3,
2010), online at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/kallas/headlines/news/2010/05/20100503_extraordinary-transport-councilde.htm
(visited Apr 14, 2011) (noting that one of the EU's proposals for reform mentioned during the
height of the crisis included "fast track[ing] critical elements of the Single European Sky II
package" and that "[f]ull implementation of the Single European Sky and a review of safety
assessment for volcanic activity are critical to manage such crises in the future.").
116 Alex Derber, Europe and USA take step towards ATM interoperabikly (Flightglobal.com June 24,
2010), online at http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/06/24/343582/europe-and-usa-
take-step-towards-atm-interoperability.html (visited Apr 14, 2011).
117 Environment News Service, Volcano Cisis: Europe to Fast-Track Single Sky, Compensate Airlines (ENS
Apr 28, 2010), online at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr20lO/2010-04-28-02.html
(visited Apr 14, 2011).
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would align European air traffic management according to "traffic flows rather
than national borders."" 8
Despite these forceful calls for accelerated SES-II implementation,
blowback against this proposal indicated that the threat to air travel from
volcanic ash or other future disruptions would not be alleviated by additional
supranational coordination of air traffic control."' Airlines themselves desired
the ability to make their own risk calculations, on the premise that they had the
technological capabilities to test their own planes, and determine for themselves
at what particle density they could safely fly.120 This was seen clearly in the
preemptive KLM and British Airways test flights (though these were conducted
with permission granted by state authorities). During the crisis, one admired
model for future regulation was the US's, which allows individual airlines to
make decisions to fly based on recommendations from the FAA.
Because of the unpopularity of the precautions taken by European
multilateral and sovereign authorities during the crisis, the near-instantaneous
calls for more rapid SES-II adoption and additional integration were not well
received.1'2 Yet it was somewhat understandable that in the aftermath of the
crisis European authorities would instantly defer to the Single Sky expansion as a
default solution to the volcano crisis. Because EU integration does not yet
extend to air traffic control, "[o]nly Member States can decide whether or not to
close their airspace. As a result, the EU boasts twenty-seven different air traffic
zones, each able to impose a flying ban."122 Many executives and lawyers think
that it is necessary for sovereign governments to surrender any power over ATM
to multinational authorities to facilitate superior service.123 The airline industry,
118 Id.
119 See, for example, Bruno Waters and Andrew Hough, Iceland volcano air restrictions are excessive, says
European Commission (The Daily Telegraph Apr 19, 2010), online at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7607216/Iceland-volcano-air-restrictions-are-
excessive-says-European-Commission.html (visited Aug 31, 2010) (citing concerns over the effect
of ash clouds on jet engines).
120 See Hough, et al, Volcanic ash cloud (cited in note 104).
121 See Leo Cendrowicz, After the Ash: What Europe Can Learn from the Crisis (TIME Mag Apr 22,
2010), online at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1983806,00.html (visited Apr
14, 2011).
122 Alemanno, The European Vokanic Ash Crisis (cited in note 2).
123 See, for example, Quinn, 23 No 1 Air & Space Lawyer at 3 (cited in note 73) (recommending that
sovereign governments must "cede competency to transnational accident and air traffic control
authorities"). For the statement of Carolyn McCall, CEO of European discount airline Easyjet on
Fiscal Year 2010's Financials, see Eayjet FY10 Profit Rises (The Financial Nov 16, 2010) online at
http://www.finchannel.com/newsflash/TravelBizNews/75639_EasyJetFY1 0ProfitRises_
/ ("The closure of European airspace because of volcanic ash and the wide scale air traffic control
disruption across Europe have highlighted some of the weaknesses of the current policy
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however, strongly believed that aircraft should have been flying sooner than
national authorities would permit. Once the April ban had been in place for
three days, the cries for a re-opening grew louder.'24
The International Air Transport Association (IATA), the airline industry's
advocacy group, was also strongly against the airspace closures by the time it
became clear that sovereign authorities were improperly quantifying the ash risk.
In late May, when the UK airports were closed for the second time, the
organization's head stated,
Numbers show that the current system is flawed. . . . Over 200,000 flights
have operated in European airspace identified by the VAAC . . . as having
the potential presence of ash. Not one aircraft has reported significant ash
presence and this is verified by post-flight aircraft and engine inspections.
We must back the theory with facts gathered by aircraft to test ash
concentration.125
One may draw a conclusion that the IATA was then in favor of a
sovereign air solution to the crisis, but it was not. The same IATA leadership
blasted individual states for using the same data as those with open airports to
close their airspace.
The UK government, in turn, blamed the engine manufacturers for
specifying levels of particle density that were too conservative.126 European
airlines lauded the US system of air traffic management in the aftermath of the
crisis as a solution: to defer questions of flying conditions to the individual
framework. We are supporting efforts to put in place a European framework to deal with future
crises.") (visited Apr 14, 2011). See also Jon Robinson, How we karntfrom the 'unique'expeience of the
volcanic asb cloud disruption (Nottingham Post Dec 31, 2010), online at
http://www.thisisnottingham.co.uk/news/learnt-unique-experience-volcanic-ash-cloud-
disruption/article-3051 653-detail/article.html (visited Apr 14, 2011).
124 On April 24, Richard Branson, the head of Virgin Atlantic, "condemn[ed] flight restrictions as an
'overreaction' and blame[d] the [UK] [g]overnment for grounding flights for six days when
experts said there was no danger." Later, during the second phase of the UK's cancellations in
May, Branson again went to the press with substantial criticisms of how the UK in particular was
dealing with the crisis as compared with the rest of Europe. See Volcanic ash: timekne of the fkght
disruption (The Telegraph May 16, 2010), online at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7730428/Volcanic-ash-timeline-of-the-flight-
disruption.html (visited Apr 14, 2011).
125 See Perry Flint, IATA slams European governments, regulators over airspace closures (Air Transport World
May 19, 2010), online at http://atwonline.com/intemational-aviation-regulation/news/iata-
slams-european-governments-regulators-over-airspace-clos (visited Apr 14, 2011). At the same
time, the IATA was strongly in favor of sovereign decisions to mitigate the closures by relaxing
their particle density requirements for flight, essentially enabling airlines to fly into areas
previously deemed to have reported ash. Id.
126 See Volcano ash fight ban 'might have ended sooner' (BBC May 3, 2010), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8654559.stm (visited Apr 14, 2011).
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private carriers in possession of all of the data they can have.'27 After all, it was
these entities that ended up spearheading many of the test flights and making
their own determinations of the safety. This is the model used by the FAA in the
US, and it could lead to a more appropriate response. The airlines would have
the best incentives to weigh most effectively safety issues against the desire to
stem cancellations.
Others argued that a key problem with future integration as a cure-all is
that Eurocontrol itself is not immune from massive technological problems,
which are amplified when it serves as a single ATM provider for large swaths of
Europe.'28 In sum, the reaction to the crisis was swift and varied, from official
pronouncements in favor of rapid Single Sky implementation, to those who
placed the blame on Eurocontrol, to those who blamed the countries themselves
for a slow crisis response and an inability to properly balance the disruption to
passengers with the need for a focus on safety in air travel.
B. The Second Phase of Single Sky
The nations, which collaborated to pass SES-I in 2004, intended for
gradual implementation as various stakeholders developed their institutional
competencies and nations became more comfortable with the delegation of
authority. Eventually, SES-I was to be supplanted by SES-II.12 9 In the aftermath
of the volcano crisis, and in the face of withering criticism, early implementation
of SES-II became the go-to reform touted by EU officials as a solution to future
air traffic management crises.130 SES-II, announced by the European
127 According to one risk management firm, critics "have compared the alleged [European response]
less than favorably to the American model in which authorities make available to individual
airlines an outline of prevailing conditions, leaving the burden on them to decide whether or not
to fly." ijet Intelligent Risk Systems, Press Release, Looking for a Silver Lining in Europe's Ash Cloud
(May 2010), online at http://www.ijet.com/european-ash-cloud/SR-0392-01 Looking for a
Silver Lining in Europe%27s Ash Cloud.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2011).
128 See, for example, Air Traffic Contml Equiement Failure Disrupts Fghts Over Northern Europe (Aug 20,
2010), online at http://nycaviation.com/2010/08/air-traffic-control-equipment-failure-disrupts-
flights-over-northern-europe/ (visited Apr 14, 2011).
129 DFS Home Page, Single Sky, Art 3, online at
http://www.dfs.de/dfs/internet_2008/module/dfs-in-europa/englisch/dfsin europe/single_e
uropeansky/sesji/framework_549.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2011).
130 European Union Press Release, Eumpean measures to minimiZe disruption caused by volcanic ash (May 21,
2010), online at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/601&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=en (visited Apr 14, 2011) ("The improved approach [policies supported by SES-II]
will offer Member States greater flexibility in deciding how to manage their airspace, allowing for
less flight disruption while still ensuring the highest level of safety.").
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Commission in June 2008"' and adopted by the European Council in October
2009132 provides for a wholesale revision of SES-I policies as under the original
high-level report."' At the broadest level, the official goals of the new package
include cutting the cost of flying in half, decreasing the environmental impact of
flight by 10 percent through more efficient use of airspace and de-carbonization,
and a three-fold increase in EU air traffic capacity while maintaining current
safety standards.
More specifically, the second phase package includes establishment of the
EU as the sole European air traffic regulator, increasing political and military
support for the reforms, and broad cooperation between the defense ministers
of the EU nations and Eurocontrol to ensure a smooth transition to
organization of the European sky into functional airspace blocks (FABs), the
entities whose implementation will allow SES-II to accomplish its key goals.'3 A
FAB is a block of multiple nations that will be expected to pool their air traffic
management resources to create a "single sky" for that region, managed by a
single air traffic control entity. FABs are a critical organizational component of
the new SES-II proposal. Philosophically, they reject classical notions of
sovereignty-they are explicitly created "regardless of State boundaries" '3 -and
embrace the idea that groups of nations eliminating their individual borders in
the sky can lead to smoother air traffic management. Each EU member needs to
be a member of a FAB by 2012 (there are only two in operational existence right
now, though more are in the planning stages).' 36 This step-moving beyond just
coordination or standard-setting in safety regulation-is far and away the most
challenging practical step for SES-II, as it is the first major point at which
131 European Commission Home Page, Single European Sky Second Package (SES II)--Q&A (cited in
note 4).
132 Council Regulation 1070/2009, 2009 OJ (L 300/34) (cited in note 3).
133 European Commission Home Page, Single European Sky II, online at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/singleeuropean-sky/ses_2_en.htm (visited Apr 14, 2011). See
also Declaration of Madrid, Conclusions of the High Level Conference Roadmap towards implementing the
Single Eumpean Sky (Feb 25-26, 2010), online at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/single.-curopean-sky/doc/2010_02_26_madriddeclaration.p
df (visited Apr 14, 2011).
134 Eurocontrol Home Page, FuntionalAirspace Blocks (FABs) and the Single European Sky (SES), online
at http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/functional-airspace-blocks-fabs-and-single-european-sky-
ses (visited Apr 15, 2011).
135 Eurocontrol Home Page, STATFOR Frequently Asked Questions, online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/statfor/public/faq/faq.htmA#qa07 (visited Apr 15, 2011).
136 Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission, Evaluation of Functional Airspace Block (FAB)
Initiatives and their contribution to Performance Improvement 2.3.7 (Oct 2008), online at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/studies/doc/traffic-management/evaluation-of fabsfinalre
port.execsum.pdf (visited Apr 15, 2011).
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nations have to actually consider the political and military constraints that air
traffic centralization may impose.
The North European and Austrian Consortium (NORACON) FAB covers
Northern Europe and Austria, controlling 13 percent of European instrument
flight rules air traffic.' 3 ' The benefit of an FAB, for economic and environmental
purposes, is that because it literally breaks down national borders in the sky,
flights can travel in straight lines from point-to-point, conserving fuel and
lowering the carbon footprint of each flight. Further, because one
communication system governs each FAB, the flights would be made
incrementally safer. FABs are made even more attractive because of the
incentives states face. Sovereign nations may simply not care about air traffic
management and view positively any way to outsource this role to multilateral
organizations.138 Despite this view, and any cost savings it may entail, such a
clear delegation of sovereignty, may lead to consequences of vital importance to
many people outside the EU bureaucracy.'3 1
The SES-II package of reforms also calls for Eurocontrol to conduct a
series of performance plans for national air traffic managers, which would then
serve as a baseline for EU performance monitoring. Additionally, SES-II will be
integrated with the EASA, which was established in 2003 to serve as a regulator
of airport and ATM safety, and to serve as more of a regional standards
organization (with a more localized footprint than ICAO) for EU aircraft
maintenance and air traffic controller training and licensing. EASA seems to
overlap with Eurocontrol in many functions, but they aim to agree on setting
aside a separate portfolio for each."
137 NORACON Home Page, About NORACON, online at
http://www.noracon.aero/magnoliaPublic/about (visited Apr 15, 2011).
138 Ad Rutten, the chief operating officer of the Schipol Group, a European airport management
firm, made this perspective clear. See Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, ACI's Airport Exchange in
Istanbul 'National governments have little interest in aviation' (Nov 15, 2010), online at
http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2010/11/15/acis-airport-exchange-in-istanbulnational-
governments-have-little-interest-in-aviation/pagel (concerning Rutten's speech, in which he
argued that "there were three clear lessons from the [Icelandic volcano] crisis: 1) National
governments appear to have little interest in supporting aviation; 2) Implementing the Single
European Sky is an immediate and urgent priority; 3) Aviation is essential to the life of Europe's
citizens and businesses") (visited Apr 15, 2011).
139 One example is the response from the EU Council of Regions, intended to give people a non-
binding vote or opportunity to review EU regulation. See EU Council of Regions Opinion, online
at http://coropinions.cor.europa.eu/CORopinionDocument.aspx?identifier=cdr\coter-
iv\dossiers\coter-iv-021 \cdr333-2008_fin ac.doc&language=EN (visited Apr 15, 2011).
10 See European Aviation Safety Agency Press Release, EUROCONTROL and EASA co-operate
close# in Single Eurpean Sky (Oct 16, 2008), online at
http://www.easa.europa.eu/communications/press-releases/PRenl6102008.html ("'[EASA] will
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Hardly a month before the volcano crisis began, the European
Commission, Eurocontrol, and the Spanish government hosted a high-level
conference in Madrid to discuss the launch of SES-II, which they originally
planned to roll out in 2012, with a final integration goal date set for 2020.141
However, EU officials, in light of the Icelandic crisis, are seeking to accelerate
the process of implementation.14 2 But would SES-II have changed anything
during the Icelandic crisis? As stated above, the cancellations during the volcano
crisis stemmed from a data transmission from VAAC to Eurocontrol, which
then transmitted the data and made recommendations to sovereign ATM
officials, who then, in concert with their national safety regulators, made the
decision to close or to open the airspace.
Under SES-II, there would likely be quicker communication facilitated
between VAAC and the individual FAB. While still unclear, it would be natural
under the structure of an FAB (with no sovereign ATM agency) that the
decision to close or open airspace would be shifted to the FAB itself. In a future
crisis requiring continent-wide coordination, instead of permitting sovereign-
level airspace closure decision-making, those judgments would instead be made
at the FAB level. Future safety regulation research is needed to evaluate the
efficacy of FAB, SES-II, and the ATM framework's ability to manage the next
crisis. But before that work can be done, is the SES-II framework even
consistent with existing European law?
C. Conflict Between Single Sky Goals and the Legal Reality
Further ATM integration in Europe under SES-II structure must remain
within the confines of the existing legal framework governing air traffic
management.'4 3 The Chicago Convention envisioned a world of air traffic
management in which each nation retained its own sovereignty but shared
uniform rules and standards governing air travel. The Single Sky package of
European reforms, however, envisions a future in which all European air traffic
management is merged into a single multilateral body-and this expansion of
work in close parmership with EUROCONTROL to achieve the most efficient regulatory system
without gaps or overlaps."') (visited Apr 15, 2011).
141 Declaration of Madrid, Conclusions (cited in note 133). For the Roadmap itself, see European
Commission Home Page, Transport Events, online at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/events/2010_02_25_sesen.htm (visited Apr 15, 2011).
142 European Commission Home Page, Transport Ministers Meet to Agree Response to Crisis (May 3,
2010), online at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/kallas/headlines/news/2010/05/20100503_extraordinary-transportcouncil_de.htm
(visited Apr 15, 2011).
143 See Section II.
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multilateral authority may place Eurocontrol's goals in conflict with the UN
under the Chicago Convention.
A possible solution to this challenge may be that under the Chicago
Convention and as a specialized agency of the UN, the ICAO can expand its
authority in air transit regulation through the establishment of regional bodies.'"
This power, however, under Article 55(a) of the Chicago Convention, has been
unused historically, and has given way to the development of the numerous
independent agencies that make up modern air regulation today.145 However,
Article 83 of the Chicago Convention provides that states may take actions in air
travel regulation on a multilateral basis, provided that the activities of any state
do not undermine ICAO's powers.146 As it says, "any contracting State may
make arrangements not inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention."147
However, if the arrangement-such as SES-II-is inconsistent with the Chicago
Convention, Article 82 would apply, as the Convention "abrogat[es] all
obligations and understandings between [nations] which are inconsistent with
[Convention] terms, and [the contracting States] undertake not to enter into any
such obligations and understandings."148 Therefore, it can be argued that any
action which serves to undermine Article 1-the statement of national
sovereignty-would be abrogated by the terms of ICAO.
The Chicago Convention's Article I statement of national sovereignty 49
has served as a bedrock principle of multilateral air regulation and, in fact,
confirms a major tenet of public international air law: the continuing sovereignty
of a nation over its airspace. The SES-I package, through the use of FABs,
would seem to be inconsistent with this broad understanding. As has been said,
"[t]raditionally and principally, ATM is a task that falls under the responsibility
of States parties to the Chicago Convention on international civil aviation of
1944. Hence, it was regarded as a national affair."15 0
One response to this may be that the Chicago Convention anticipates the
centralized management of air traffic. While the Chicago Convention contains
144 Chicago Convention, Art 55(a), 61 Stat 1180.
145 Id. See also Weber, Introduction at 119-20 (cited in note 25) ("While a need was felt... [to establish
regional subsidiaries of ICAO]... Article 55(a) was not used, mainly for political reasons.").
146 Id at Art 83.
147 Id.
148 Chicago Convention, Art 82, 61 Stat 1180.
149 Chicago Convention, Art 1, 61 Stat 1180. Article 1 in its entirety says merely that "[t]he
contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the
airspace above its territory."
1so Mendes de Leon, The Reladonshbo Between Eumcontrol and the EC. Living Apart Together, 4 Intl Orgs L
Rev at 305 (cited in note 66) (emphases omitted).
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no mention of air traffic management at all, Article 22 may provide the
answer."' By asking that "[e]ach contracting State . . . adopt all practicable
measures, through the issuance of special regulations or otherwise, to facilitate
and expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories of contracting States,
and to prevent unnecessary delays to aircraft . . . " it may consider Eurocontrol-
type operational agreements completely "practicable." 5 2 Further, in Article 37,
the Convention urges participating states to "undertake[] to collaborate in
securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity" in terms of air traffic
"rules" and "practices."' 3 However, Article 37 does not mention uniformity in
the act of air traffic management itself. Rather, Article 37 only aims for uniform
rules and standards across ATM providers of different nations. Article 37 also
includes a catchall provision, which mentions uniformity in "other matters
concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may
from time to time appear appropriate."'" Any challenge to SES-II's consistency
with ICAO would likely start with Article 37.
However, in all of these cases, a clearer understanding of what sovereignty
actually means under the Chicago Convention is necessary for the rules
themselves to be internally consistent with the Convention's own mandate for
the maintenance of sovereign airspace. SES-II could be problematic under a
traditional definition of sovereignty, in which the Eurocontrol nations would
need to coordinate their airspace and ATM systems without a wholesale
delegation of authority to Eurocontrol, while Eurocontrol's own vision of
sovereignty views the act of delegating state power to a multilateral body as an
act of sovereignty itself. Under the traditional definition, ICAO's role itself
would likely not be consistent, though the modest goal of standard-setting could
be seen as a middle ground, making such a role reasonable, while the wholesale
delegation of ATM to a multilateral body-including military coordination-
would be going too far in contravention of Article 1 to be permissible under the
Convention.
SES-II itself at least grants ICAO policies and the key ICAO principles the
weight of affirming rhetoric. Eurocontrol states that it is "necessary to establish
a framework for the definition, implementation and enforcement of binding
performance targets in key performance areas in line with the policies of
[ICAO]."'s In return, ICAO maintains working relationships with Eurocontrol
and two other organizations that provide similar air traffic management services
1s' Chicago Convention, Art 22, 61 Stat 1180.
152 Id.
153 Id at Art 37.
1' Id Art 37.
155 Council Regulation 1070/2009 2009 OJ (L 300/34) (cited in note 3).
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to its member states-in Africa and in Central America.'1 6 The question of
whether or not Eurocontrol actually conforms with these international public
law norms hinges clearly on the definition of "sovereignty" used by ICAO.
One way to judge the importance of Article I "sovereignty" in the ICAO
context is to see how ICAO governs the areas that would overlap with
Eurocontrol's powers to implement Single Sky. In this case, it is how ICAO sets
standards in air traffic management, and an evaluation of whether ICAO's own
powers actually intrude on a concept of sovereignty in the same way that this
Comment uses the term. ICAO has powers under Article 37 of the Chicago
Convention to establish standards."' Pursuant to this power, ICAO has issued
Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)."' The PANS are, according to
Ludwig Weber, "operating procedures applicable worldwide, which have not yet
attained 'a significant degree of maturity for adoption as International Standards
and Recommended Practices . . . ."'1" Essentially, these regulations provide
more detail to nations regarding how their air navigation systems are to be
managed-these are under the PANS-ATM, or Air Traffic Management,
standard, which includes directives on satellite and other navigational
technologies. However, as in the context of the Icelandic crisis, these standards
would not set out a regime by which each country would need to delegate
airspace closure decisions to a single centralized body.
These are not mandatory standards. Under Article 38 of the Chicago
Convention, individual member-nations are permitted to opt out of a rule
promulgated by ICAO. Article 38, titled "Departures from International
Standards and Procedures" provides the rules whereby a nation can find a given
"standard or procedure" to be "impracticable" and can adopt its own rule on
point, with the only added procedure being a provision of notice to ICAO of the
differences between the two standards, which is then communicated to the
remainder of the member states.o6 0 Thus, a conclusion can be drawn that,
despite the limitations on national sovereignty which result from a mandatory
regime of international rules and standards, ICAO expressly permits an opt-out
by a member state without any judgment of the rationale behind the change. To
apply this standard to Eurocontrol, it would seem that, despite its internal
inconsistency with notions of state sovereignty, ICAO would accept the Single
Sky plan as consistent with its own vision of Article 1.
15 See Weber, Intrdution at 122 (cited in note 25).
157 Chicago Convention, Art 37, 61 Stat 1180.
158 See Weber, Intvdution at 67 (cited in note 25).
5 Id.
160 Chicago Convention, Art 38, 61 Stat 1180.
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The next consideration is whether SES-II is consistent with existing EU
law. While it has been passed under EU law, and EU officials are clearly in favor
of Eurocontrol's proposals, it must be evaluated, as a technical matter, whether
the proposal for air traffic integration reconciles with specific EU and national
laws. As has been noted in regards to earlier iterations of Eurocontrol," .. . the
extended functions of EUROCONTROL necessarily result in a partial loss of
[national] competency in ATM matters insofar as binding law- and decision-
making is concerned."' Clearly the delegation of broad ATM authority under
the FAB structure would include substantial shifts in decision-making authority
to multilateral authorities.
Miscellaneous challenges against SES-II may remain from a European
perspective. Similar to possible attacks by ICAO against SES-Il, Eurocontrol has
been challenged on the basis that it necessitates the surrendering of national
sovereignty over air traffic management to FABs. Under Article 1 of the revised
Eurocontrol Convention, "[t]he pursuit of these objectives shall not prejudice
the principle that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the
airspace above its territory nor the capacity of every State to exercise its
prerogatives with regard to security and defence in its national airspace." 162 This
would seem to place SES-II in conflict with Eurocontrol's very own charter.
161 Walter Schwenk and Riidiger Schwenk, Aspects of International Co-operation in Air Traffic Management
128 (Kluwer Law International 1998). For an example of how SES-II disregards state borders, see
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Single European sky II: towards
more sustainable and better performing aviation, online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0389:EN:HTML:NOT (visited
Apr 15, 2011):
The current European route network still is an amalgamation of national
routes. The design of routes is in many cases the product of historical national
considerations. Routes for intra-European flights are some 15% less efficient
than domestic flight routes. In addition, the route network is not always well
aligned with European traffic. The shortest available routes are underused due
to the lack of precise, real-time information. Airspace is a scarce resource,
which has to satisfy the requirements of both civil and military airspace users.
Its efficient use depends on how all flight phases, including appropriate
planning and preparation, are integrated within seamless air and ground
operations and on how new users such as unmanned aerial vehicles or very
light jets are served. Aircraft should thus use shorter and better routes to
improve the sustainability of aviation. (citations omitted).
162 Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Protocol Consolidating the Eurocontrol
International Convention Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation of 13
December 1960, as Variously Amended *11 (entered into force June 27, 1997), online at
http://www.atmpp.it/upload/Project-Mosaic/Progetto-Mosaic/1494/revised-convention-of-
eurocontrol.pdf (visited Apr 15, 2011).
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However, under the establishment of Eurocontrol and the assent to
Eurocontrol by the EC,"' there seems to be a common understanding that the
EU has a strong hand in these reforms. Judicial review of Eurocontrol has only
come up in terms of route charges, and Eurocontrol's powers have been
affirmed.'64 Further, adherence to Eurocontrol is mandatory for EU
membership, and has become both a key part of the EU-accession process, and
is generally understood to be a key part of the European Commission's
transportation-regulation function.
Finally, there are some labor concerns regarding the usage of air traffic
controllers from private organizations at the expense of other states. Is it legal to
supplant labor agreements in one Eurocontrol nation for an air traffic
management framework managed by a multilateral one in which the controllers
are hired through a different mechanism? Germany, for example, has avoided
this problem by, first, privatizing its ATM service, and then, second, having this
private entity sign on as an ATM provider for the Germany-inclusive FAB.
While labor has been cause for political concern, under existing EU law, there
does not seem to be a clear path for a challenge to Eurocontrol's labor
arrangements.
The most critical issue then, is whether the Single Sky proposals conflict in
a meaningful way with the amorphous concept of state sovereignty.
V. A FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN SAFETY AND SOVEREIGNTY?
Consider two opinions. In 1996, before the proposal of SES-I, air law
scholar Amir A. Majid predicted that in the future," .. . EUROCONTROL is
most likely to . . . [scale] down further the dream of having a single [ATM]
provider [for all of Europe] which requires a most trusting concept of
sovereignty.,' 6 1 In a 2009 Eurocontrol study specifically concerning the issue of
sovereignty as applied to European ATM reforms, another air law scholar, Pablo
Mendes de Leon, wrote that "States can pool their resources in the exercise of their
sovereign rghts, without affecting the principle of sovereignty." 66 Essentially,
Eurocontrol now argues that delegating sovereign rights to a multilateral
organization is actually a manifestation of sovereignty, while the individual states
are themselves reticent to let go of their sovereign control over the skies.
163 For a discussion of the scope of early European Community powers, see Martin Holland,
European Communiy Integration 183-202 (St. Martin's 1993).
'6 Majid, Legal Status at 93 (cited in note 15).
165 Majid, Legal Status at 109 (cited in note 15) (capitalization in original).
166 Pablo Mendes de Leon, Soveregny in Atiation, vi (Eurocontrol Apr 3, 2009), online at
http://www.eurocontrol.int/mil/gallery/content/public/event-docs/Sovereignty%/20in%/2OAvia
tion%20040309%20updated.pdf (visited Apr 15, 2011) (emphasis in original).
Vol. 12 No. 1262
Safety and/or Sovereignt?
Whether this is a basic philosophical or political issue, a labor issue, a military
issue, or some combination of all, is undefined.
Despite the EU's official protestations to the contrary, the mere existence
of Eurocontrol's eighty-two page report.'. undoubtedly illustrates that it is no
overstatement that aviation itself poses a great philosophical challenge to more
traditional conceptions of sovereignty."' Sovereign concerns are justified.
Because aviation reaches so easily across international borders-there are no
fences in the sky-the very idea of air travel forces us to consider exactly what
we mean by "sovereignty" or "multilateralism." For sure, there are basic ideas
upon which all can agree: next-generation technology and more integration and
uniformity of computer systems is an inherent good. Better and more unified
communication between air traffic controllers is also something we want. Yet
when it comes to decision-making and crisis management, organized is superior
to disorganized. But, does that imply deferring to a single centralized decision
maker, as the EU might like? Or might there be some benefit in retaining the
multitude of opinions so thoroughly criticized during the volcano crisis? As has
been illustrated above, there are costs and benefits to increased centralization of
decision-making in aviation, just as there are costs and benefits to any further
amount of international integration. But in a practical sense, the sovereignty
issue poses a unique challenge because not only is it a political hurdle, but the
language of sovereignty is also infused into each of the foundational documents
of air traffic integration.
Debates over the sovereignty and the power of the nation-state in Europe
reach back to the very emergence of Europe as a group of nation-states
following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Nowadays, due to the interplay of
politics within the broader framework, the idea of an integrated Europe will fail
if it loses sight of sovereignty as traditionally defined-"supreme authority within a
territory."'69 But what does this definition actually mean?
In his 1999 study on sovereignty, Stephen D. Krasner divided the concept
of sovereignty into the four ways in which the term has been used.o17 Krasner's
analysis, however, focuses on Westphalian sovereignty, or "political organization
167 See generally id.
168 European Commission Home Page, Single European Sky Second Package (SES II)- &A (cited in
note 4) ("Air traffic control is mistakenly related to national sovereignty. Obviously this is a
complex argument, but, instead of prompting innovative solutions for exercising sovereignty, it
has been used to block cross-border integration.").
169 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sovereignty Oune 8, 2010), online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/ (visited Apr 15, 2011) (italics in original).
170 The four types of sovereignty are: (1) international legal sovereignty, (2) Westphalian sovereignty,
(3) domestic sovereignty, and (4) interdependence sovereignty. See Stephen D. Krasner,
Sovereignty: Organi!ed Hypocrigy 3 (Princeton 1999).
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based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a
given territory."1 71 Westphalian sovereignty seems to have its roots closest to
what we would deem "classical" notions of sovereignty and provides helpful
insights to proposed European integration.172 By delegating the air traffic
management of its own skies, a nation surrenders some amount of sovereignty
under the Westphalian view if the air traffic management operator-in the
European case, Eurocontrol-is an external actor. This view of sovereignty
conflicts with the European idea that a delegation of internal political power to
external actors is actually a manifestation of sovereignty. Similarly, Krasner
deems the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to be
"supranational authority structures."173 Eurocontrol similarly fits into this rubric,
given the source of its authority and its envisioned operational role over its
member states. However, contrary to many of the edicts of the European Court
of Justice or trade regulations of the European Commission, the delegation of
operational airspace management is not an act that can easily be re-captured by
the sovereign nation. Once delegated, a massive infrastructure like that is often
nearly impossible to rebuild, making the grant of power to Eurocontrol far more
expensive than may be originally thought. One solution to this can be the
sovereign retention of substantial capabilities for military airspace management
even under the Eurocontrol FAB structure. Krasner argues that ". . . the
characteristics that are associated with sovereignty-territory, autonomy,
recognition, and control-do not provide an accurate description of the actual
practices that have characterized many entities that have been conventionally
viewed as sovereign states."'7 4 This holds true for the delegation of air traffic
control. While the image of a pure delegation of control over a nation's
sovereign skies seems irreconcilable with Westphalian or other views of
sovereignty, all of the states would likely consider themselves to remain
sovereign-given their assent to other supranational authorities, like the EU.
Implicitly, as seen in the response to the volcano crisis, EU officials seem
to argue that the choice Europe faces is between a secure air traffic management
system on one hand, and a real destruction of a proper notion of national
sovereignty in airspace management on the other. Without making normative
claims about the benefit of retaining sovereignty in air traffic management, this
Comment again returns to the implications of the Icelandic volcano crisis.
171 Id at 4.
172 Westphalian sovereignty is the primary focus of Krasner's study as well. Id.
173 Id at 235.
174 Krasner, Sovergnty at 237 (cited in note 170).
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A. Sovereign Air Traffic Management and the Single Sky
While international bodies have long served as standard-setting
organizations, there has been no historic role for multilateralism in the
governance of air traffic control itself.s7 1 The power to direct which flights enter
and exit a nation's airspace has always remained with that sovereign. In the US,
for example, the FAA serves as a regulator of all flights, with the exception of
military traffic.'7 1 In the UK, the CAA, a government regulator, governs most
aspects of UK aviation.'77 However, in 2002, the CAA delegated air traffic
management authority to a private company, NATS, under a private-public
partnership established in 1998.' The CAA serves as the local UK agent
responsible for implementation of both SES-I and SES-II. During the volcano
crisis, it was the CAA that received updates from Eurocontrol, VAAC, and the
Met Office and ordered NATS to cease serving commercial flights, instituting
the flight stoppage.'79
As detailed above, the London outpost of the VAAC held monitoring
responsibility for the ash cloud over Eyjafjallaj6kull and then provided its input
to Eurocontrol, which then delivered analysis to sovereign air traffic managers
who made decisions in consultation with their governments regarding the
closing of their respective airspace-most of which fell precisely in line with the
central regulator's recommendations on the matter.180
In Germany, the national air traffic manager is Deutsche Flugsicherung
(DFS), a private entity in partnership with the German government, in an
arrangement made in cooperation with Eurocontrol, which, through the Benelux
FAB, manages the airspace of parts of Germany."' DFS has been included in
the plans to manage the FAB airspace under its contract with Germany. Under
this new framework, with the DFS officials providing input alongside
Eurocontrol, Germany had a different experience during the volcano crisis, with
1s See Section II.A (discussing the history of ICAO).
176 Federal Aviation Administration Home Page, online at
http://www.faa.gov/about/history/briefjhistory/ (visited Apr 15, 2011).
17 Civil Aviation Authority Home Page, online at http://www.caa.co.uk/ (visited Apr 15, 2011).
'7 NATS Home Page, History, online at http://www.nats.co.uk/about-us/our-history/ (visited Apr
15, 2011).
179 For an early comparison of bilateral, multilateral, and sovereign air regulation, see generally
Gidwitz, The Poitics of InternationalAir Transport (cited in note 39).
180 See Section III.C.
181 Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS) Home Page, Business, online at
http://www.dfs.de/dfs/intemet-2008/module/unternehmen-dfs/englisch/about-dfs/business/
index.html (visited Apr 15, 2011).
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briefer airspace closures than those in other countries, and more gradual
reopening with authorities willing to accommodate flights at lower altitudes.12
Spain, on the other hand, through Aeropuertos Espafioles y Navegaci6n
A6rea (AENA), its own sovereign air traffic regulator, fell in line with
Eurocontrol recommendations.' In May, when the ash cloud moved to the
Iberian Peninsula, Spain was deeply affected.'" The standard communication
occurred here between Eurocontrol and the sovereign ATM authority. This was
identical to what happened in France during the same time period, when its
sovereign ATM, DSNA, made similar decisions in line with Eurocontrol
recommendations.' In Italy, the sovereign ATM authority, Ente Nazionale per
I'Aviazione Civile (ENAV), had been involved in ICAO volcano ash test
procedures in the past'-in fact, as recently as three months before the crisis.
While it may seem that some of these nations were able to create their own
plans for dealing with the crisis based on recommendations specifically tailored
for their respective airspace, many officials and experts remain convinced that
were it not for an outmoded view of the nation-state in Europe allowing for
these institutions in the first place, the integration towards a full Single European
Sky would be complete.'
182 See German airspace remains closed until Tuesday-DFS (Reuters Apr 19, 2010), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE632BS20100419 (visited Apr 15, 2011) (highlighting
the flexibility some flights were given at lower altitudes, in comparison with the UK cancellation
experience).
183 Maria Sullivan, Icelandic Volcano Shuts Spanish Airports (SpanishNews.es May 8, 2010), online at
http://www.spanishnews.es/20100508-icelandic-volcano-shuts-spanish-airports/id=2453/
(visited Apr 15, 2011).
184 Id (noting 226 flights cancelled and 28,000 passengers stranded).
185 See Functional Airspace Block Europe Central (FABEC), Media Release: Volcanic contamination:
FABECAir Navigation Service Providers developing a common approach for central Europe (April 22, 2010),
online at
http://www.skyguide.ch/fr/Dossiers/DossierSingleEuropeanSky/FAB/FABEC-mediarelease
2010-04-22_Volcanic-contaminationCommon-approach-forCentralEurope.pdf (visited Apr
15, 2011).
186 Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile (ENAV) Press Office Home Page, ENAV hosted the ICAO
Volcanic Ash Exercises Steering Group, online at
http://www.enav.it/portal/page/portal/PortaleENAV/HomeEN/ComunicazioneEN?Curren
tPath=/enav/en/comunication/news/news-archive/VolcanicAsh_Exercises (visited Apr 15,
2011).
187 Despite his own denials, for a view fully consistent with this, see Erwin von den Steinen, National
Interest and InternationalAviation 126-30 (Kluwer 2006).
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B. Return to Chicago: Sovereignty as a Solution to Air Traffic
Management
The Chicago Convention mandates that its own rules not intrude on
Article 1: the fundamental right of a nation to control its own airspace.188
Eurocontrol itself clearly has not ignored the sovereignty implications of the
SES-II package of reforms, and Eurocontrol institutionally recognizes the
sovereign response to some of its initiatives as a key challenge to full
implementation of SES-II.'18  While ICAO and Eurocontrol may simply be
reaching for the expediency of a centralized system, they are effectively "defining
down" the concept of sovereignty. In light of the Icelandic volcano crisis, a
reappraisal of the value of much-maligned sovereignty may be in order. Pablo
Mendes de Leon and Eurocontrol argued before the crisis that the delegation of
sovereignty is actually just a manifestation of sovereignty, and that European
nations should not have anything to be concerned about regarding further
integration." 0 As Eurocontrol states,
[t]he system used in Europe to organise air navigation for civil and military
air traffic is fragmented as it is based on national boundaries. In some
instances, especially in Western and Central Europe, national airspaces have
small dimensions whereas traffic in those airspaces is dense, and is expected
to increase in the years to come. This fragmentation could be reduced by
doing away with national boundaries.' 9'
Eurocontrol continues and goes even further: "[s]trategic deliberations are
very often hampered or at least influenced by the use of the term 'sovereignty' as
if it were a sacred dogma, particularly since military operations are frequently
linked to this notion." 92 Eurocontrol also, in the Sovereignty study, essentially
defines down sovereignty in an attempt to make it seem like Eurocontrol itself is
a manifestation of sovereignty.' 93 Eurocontrol, perhaps understandably, argues
that any action taken by a state is inherently an act of its own sovereignty. This
argument is essentially backwards.'94
188 See generally Section IV.C.1.
189 See generally Mendes de Leon, Sovereigny in Aviaion (cited in note 166).
190 Id at v ("Even if sovereignty is a dynamic concept, States do not lose sovereignty by a transfer of
sovereign powers to international organisations, or the pooling of their resources or creation of
what could be termed 'joint ventures'.").
191 Id.
192 Id at 1.
193 See Mendes de Leon, Soeregny in Aviaion at 14 (cited in note 166).
194 See generally Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 Harv L Rev 1255 (2005); Jeremy A.
Rabkin, Law Without Nations? (Princeton 2005).
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In 2001, Adrian Tokir tackled Eurocontrol's argument indirectly,
paraphrasing the agency as saying "that the [EU] member states accepted this
state of affairs voluntarily and thus it per deinitionem cannot be limiting their
sovereignty, as member states are just exercising their sovereignty in a different
way."'15 Tokir went on to reject this argument, believing that such a view would
lead to an impermissibly narrow and formalistic view of sovereignty.'
For Eurocontrol to argue that a delegation of national sovereignty to a
multilateral organization is essentially equivalent to retention of sovereignty is
diametrically opposed to the concept of sovereignty embraced by the Chicago.
Convention. Voters in individual nations may dislike the idea of delegating their
state sovereignty. Certainly, in response to criticisms, EU officials can argue that
SES-II is not a permanent grant of power, and that states are free to reclaim this
power. However, this is a mere rhetorical ploy: to cede competence in air traffic
management from a sovereign to a multilateral body is not something one can
reclaim at a moment's notice. To rebuild a sovereign ATM system will require a
tremendous amount of effort, during which time the only viable alternative
would be the multilateral scheme already in place. Sovereignty in this area, once
delegated, would be slow to return.
Beyond the broader philosophical disagreements, there are practical
challenges SES-I may face. First, it is not the only proposal for the future of
European ATM-there are many other proposals apart from SES-II to re-
structure the European sky.'97 Second, the reliance on a single source of
scientific data as the basis for the flight ban led to delays far in excess of what
was necessitated by safety concerns.'" Ideally, the law will facilitate a multitude
of regulatory options. For example, Easyjet, a discount European carrier, has
developed its own ash warning system in light of the crisis.'9 Europe should
want to incentivize this sort of innovation. Overall, the airlines were not the only
entities skeptical of the ban, as Honeywell, an engine manufacturer, conducted
testing of its own to determine if the danger to travel in the ash cloud would
195 Adrian Tokir, Something Happened. Sovereignty and European Integration, 11 Institut fiir die
Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences: Vienna *1 (2001), online at
http://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-1 1-02.pdf (visited Apr 15, 2011).
196 Id.
197 See generally Kenneth Button, Wings A cross Europe (cited in note 61).
198 There was a single source of scientific evidence used to decide on the four-day ban. See Bruno
Waters and Andrew Hough, Iceland volcano air restrictions (cited in note 119).
199 Easyet to trial volcanic ash detection system (BBC News Business June 4, 2010), online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10234553 (visited Apr 15, 2010).
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actually deserve the same kind of caution that travel through a direct eruption
plume would legitimately merit.200
Even further, there are challenges to SES-II posed by sovereign militaries.
While one of the main goals of SES-II is to achieve the buy-in of all defense
ministries of its member nations, this is just one example where state sovereignty
can trump multilateral desires for integration, and is indicative of a broader
collective action or holdout problem faced by SES-II. Regardless of the
bureaucratic endorsement that SES-I has received, there is something unsettling
to national populations about the idea of surrendering air traffic management
control over their own skies-despite any cost savings or air travel efficiencies
that result.
Yet the broad Single Sky policy is not an idea foreign to either the
conceptual or practical understanding of the EU or its role in the growth of
modern global governance. It falls precisely in line with the same thinking that
motivates the unification of Europe along political, commercial, and monetary
lines. However, Single Sky is most certainly not immune from criticism because
it just happens to be similar in these respects. Unimpeded integration is not, in
and of itself, positive. Further, air traffic management is one of the key areas
where a European nation stepping into the framework of SES-II will truly cede a
large portion of what is historically defined as its sovereignty to the EU.
However, as we saw in the light of the 2010 volcano crisis, what is needed is a
sort of "jurisdictional competition" between nations, all providing concurrent
independent research and insights as they apply to the volcanic eruption or other
disaster. Certainly, national organizations can-and always will-influence the
decisions of others, and there is certainly room within this structure for more
narrowly-tailored multilateralism through joint monitoring or scientific
competencies with more communications or standard unification.
Any effort, however, by the EU or other international organization to
wholly limit the ability of a sovereign nation to govern its own airspace is not
only inconsistent with the explicit directives of the Chicago Convention, but also
should be rejected by any sovereign nation. The current structure of planned air
traffic reforms under SES-II should provide some benefit, but there are also
costs-the disincentives created for sovereign nations to develop their own air
traffic management systems, which in actuality could lead to a dearth of crisis
management opinions. As we saw in the volcano crisis, when a single entity
dictates the policy under which the remaining sovereigns simply and
a Associated Press, Honeywell to Test Efects of Vokanic Ash on jet Engines (Fox News May 27, 2010),
online at http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/05/27/honeywell-test-effects-volcanic-ash-jet-
engines/ (visited Apr 15, 2011).
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unquestionably fall into line, we leave ideas and strategies that could be helpful
off the table.
As this Comment has argued, the implementation of the SES-II reforms
poses a more substantial threat to national sovereignty under the Westphalian
view than most other recent EU integrations. While it seems that in light of the
Icelandic crisis there is only more momentum pushing the reforms into place,
there are areas remaining for European authorities to investigate in an attempt to
better reconcile European ATM with sovereign ideals. One solution to improve
safety and efficiency standards without denying nations the opportunity to build
their own ATM infrastructure could include elements of the FAA model, which
delegates cancellation decisions to airlines, while continuing to utilize functional
airspace blocks for ease of air traffic control operability and airline
communication. This scheme would bring Europe closer to the more seamless
structure of a single territorial regulator, but by pooling technological resources
and allowing for the nations to be closer to the FAB, it allows them to retain a
better sense of control over their own skies, even while accruing the benefits of
the next generation of air traffic management technology. This structure would
be closely in line with what is already in place regarding SES-II but without the
final step towards complete abandonment of national borders.
Another potential option, which may offer better protection to sovereign
interests, can include the utilization of private air traffic operators, as is done
currently in Spain and Germany. This method of organization would use
consistent standards to permit more seamless travel across borders but without
the wholesale repudiation of national borders as SES-II is now organized. It
would take the currently-existing ICAO standard-setting role and apply it
broadly to air traffic management, but with implementation at the national level.
As was seen during the Icelandic crisis, the ideal air traffic operator would be
able to delegate its own decision-making to the entities that are closest to the
information and in the position to make the best decision. In this case, it was the
airlines that had arguably more to lose than the sovereign regulators, yet at the
same time were using the press to convey their own dissatisfaction with the
blanket bans on traveling recommended by Eurocontrol.2 0'
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2010 Eyjafjallaj6kull eruption and subsequent air traffic shut-down has
been popularly labeled-even in this Comment-as an "Icelandic" volcano
201 See Section IV.A.
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crisis. 20 2 Yet this nomenclature only conveys half of the story. In reality, the
volcano crisis was a pan-European one. The structure of European air traffic
management allowed the crisis to progress to the point where a single regulator's
excessive caution and inability to quantify properly the threat led to the
preemptive cancellations of thousands of flights by numerous sovereign nations
relying on data derived from that single source-all in opposition to the interests
and desire of the airports and airlines with the most to lose from flying through
the ash cloud. Yet paradoxically, in the aftermath of this crisis, the default EU
position is to expand the scope of European integration to air traffic
management; to provide for a single organization that will dictate the EU's
future air traffic management and crisis response. Despite the technological and
coordination gains that may be derived from this integration, at the same time,
there are costs that must be addressed-including the corresponding decrease in
the ability for states to manage their own airspace.
This view of the costs and benefits of centralization stands in stark contrast
to the official European perspective on the Icelandic volcano crisis. This
European perspective sees the mass cancellations as a consequence of disunity,
and views SES-II as the only hope for improving future air safety and efficiency.
However, with its focus on integration, the European view fails to consider that
future air crises may also be alleviated by permitting individual sovereigns to
delegate the cancellation decision to the airlines, or failing that, to small,
regionally-focused, multilateral organizations making decisions based on the
entity's interpretation of the best information available. This sort of
decentralization may be reconciled with the framework of the Single European
Sky reforms through the use of FABs, and does not mean that Europe has to
rely on either twenty-seven small sovereign regulators or one gigantic regulator.
Rather, the FAB solution to improve air traffic coordination is already foreseen
by the SES-II package of reforms, but must include an opt-out regime, which
the Chicago Convention demands. States can more reliably delegate some, but
not all, air traffic management and crisis decision-making to FABs, as opposed
to going all the way to a single regulator.
Intertwined in this argument are the sovereignty implications of the
delegation of air traffic management to centralized authorities: these implications
must be considered, in some ways, to be a heavy cost to the member states.
While countries may see short term benefits resulting from a plan such as SES-
II, including more advanced technologies, fewer flight delays, and less carbon
dioxide emissions, these are not cost-free gains. Most critically, a country that
202 See, for example, Sholnn Freeman, Iceland vokano aisis nill hit European airknes worse than US., experts
say (Wash Post Apr 22, 2010), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/AR2010042104972.html (visited Apr 15, 2011).
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delegates management authority over its sky to a central authority will lose the
ability to manage its own skies for the foreseeable future. The vast infrastructure
required to manage air traffic is not like other forms of integration in that it,
unlike extradition, arms control, or monetary policy, cannot be reacquired by the
sovereign at a moment's notice. While this may seem like a slight cost right now,
the official European move toward future airspace integration must take these
challenges into account.
In the context of Europe's future, further integration seems to be the
default solution to every problem. Yet, thinking beyond European air traffic
management, if any broader lessons may be drawn from the 2010 volcanic ash
cloud crisis, it is that the benefits of sovereignty, decentralized regulatory
authority, and competing institutions with the benefit of low information costs
and strong incentives for risk management, should not be overlooked.
Vol 12 No. 1272
